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INTRODUCTION
The rules governing controlling shareholders sit at the intersec-
tion of the two facets of the core agency problem in United States
public corporations law. The first is the familiar principal-agency
problem that arises from the separation of ownership and control.
With only this facet in mind, the presence of a large shareholder may
better police management than the standard panoply of market-
oriented techniques. The second is the agency problem that arises
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders, which pro-
duces the potential for private benefits of control-benefits to the
controlling shareholder not provided to the non-controlling share-
holders. There is, however, a point of tangency between these facets.
Because there are costs associated with holding a concentrated posi-
tion and with exercising the monitoring function, some private bene-
fits of control may be necessary to induce a party to play that role.
Thus, from the public shareholders' point of view, the two facets of
the agency problem present a tradeoff. The presence of a controlling
shareholder reduces the managerial agency problem, but at the cost
of the private benefits agency problem. Non-controlling shareholders
will prefer the presence of a controlling shareholder so long as the
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benefits from reduction in managerial agency costs are greater than
the costs of private benefits of control.1
The terms of this tradeoff are determined by the origami ofjudi-
cial doctrines that describe the fiduciary obligations of a controlling
shareholder. In this Article, we examine the doctrinal limits on the
private benefits of control from a particular orientation. As we will
show, a controlling shareholder may extract private benefits of control
in one of three ways: by taking a disproportionate amount of the cor-
poration's ongoing earnings, by freezing out the minority, or by sell-
ing control. Our thesis is that the limits on these three methods of ex-
traction must be determined simultaneously, or at least consistently,
because they are in substantial respects substitutes. We then consider
a series of recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions that we argue
point in inconsistent directions--on the one hand, reducing the ex-
tent to which a controlling shareholder can extract private benefits
through selling control and, on the other, increasing the extent to
which private benefits can be extracted through freezing out non-
controlling shareholders. While judicial doctrine is too coarse a tool
to specify the perfect level of private benefits, we believe these cases
get it backwards. The potential for overreaching by controlling share-
holders is greater from freeze-outs than from sales of control, so a
shift that favors freeze-outs as opposed to sales of control is a move in
the wrong direction.
In Part I, we develop the simultaneity framework for controlling
private benefits of control and describe briefly the general doctrinal
structure. In Part II, we review and evaluate recent Delaware case law
regarding sale of control and minority freeze-outs. In particular, we
argue that the Delaware law of freeze-outs can be best reunified by giv-
ing "business judgment rule" protection to a transaction that is ap-
proved by a genuinely independent special committee that has the
power to say "no" to a freeze-out merger, while also preserving what
amounts to a class-based appraisal remedy for transactions that pro-
ceed by freeze-out tender offers without special committee approval.
Part III concludes that, although some may disagree with our views
concerning the appropriate levels of restriction governing techniques
for extracting the private benefits of control, the terms of the debate
will be more sharply focused if the rules governing these techniques
are evaluated simultaneously.
I RONALDJ. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLAcK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcQUISITIONS 1229-31 (2d ed. 1995).
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I. PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: THE LINK BETWEEN EXTRACTING
PRIVATE BENEFITS FROM OPERATING, SELLING
CONTROL, OR FREEZE-OUTS
Imagine that a controlling shareholder can extract benefits from
its ongoing operation of the company. For example, the controlling
shareholder can take out significant benefits through cost-sharing ar-
rangements that overpay the controlling shareholder for providing
central services such as pension, accounting, or the like. Alternatively,
the controlling shareholder can benefit through "tunneling"-that is,
through contractual dealings with the company, like transfer pricing,
that favor the controlling shareholder. In either event, the control-
ling shareholder secures value from its control position that is not re-
ceived by the non-controlling shareholders.
In turn, the controlling shareholder can extract the same value
from control by selling it at a premium to the value of the non-
controlling shares. The existence of an ongoing stream of private
benefits increases the value of the controlling shares compared to the
non-controlling shares by the present value of the future private bene-
fits. A sale of control simply capitalizes the cash flow associated with
private benefits of control.
The same private benefits can also be secured by freezing out the
minority shareholders. In a public corporation, the trading price of
shares in a corporation with a controlling shareholder reflects the
value of a non-controlling share.3 The price of a non-controlling
share will have been discounted by the capitalized value of the con-
trolling shareholder's private benefits. A freeze-out at the discounted
price allows the controlling shareholder to capture the capitalized
value of future private benefits.
The critical point is that, without more, we should expect doc-
trinal regimes of equivalent rigor to cover each of the three methods
of extracting private benefits. While which technique a controlling
shareholder resorts to will depend on the particular circumstances, as
yet there is no reason to favor one method over another. In fact, the
legal rules that govern the three methods are quite different. One set
of legal rules specifies the boundaries for private benefits in the ongo-
ing operation of the corporation.4 A second addresses efforts by a
2 For one description of this strategy, see Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, AM.
ECON. REV., May 2000, at 22, 22.
3 GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1234.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 7-19 (discussing this particular set of rules).
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controlling shareholder to sell control at a premium not shared with
others. A third polices freeze-outs of non-controlling shareholders. As
we will see, the rules controlling the level of private benefits from op-
erations are the central determinant of the judicial doctrine that con-
trols controlling shareholders; these rules set the level of private bene-
fits that can be appropriately capitalized through sale of control or a
freeze-out.
The rules governing a sale of control and those governing a
freeze-out of non-controlling shareholders are quite different from
one another. There is quite limited judicial intervention in the case
of sales of control and quite intensive judicial intervention in the case
of minority freeze-outs. In this Part, we argue that this pattern ofjudi-
cial intervention represents the right relationship: more intense judi-
cial review is appropriate in a freeze-out than in a sale of control. The
objective of the legal rules in both the sale of control and freeze-out
cases should be identical: to protect the controller's continuing claim
to the permissible level of private benefits while limiting the control-
ler's take to that level plus an appropriate share of the synergy gains.
This is much easier to achieve in a sale of control, where continuing
shareholders participate pro rata in synergy gains, than in a freeze-
out, where the synergy gains must be priced and allocated as part of
the freeze-out price. In the next Part, we argue that recent Delaware
case law is moving in the wrong direction.
Getting it right is not a matter of indifference. A significant body
of scholarship links capital market development and public share-
holder protection. As we will see, legal rules and the enforcement
mechanisms for those rules affect the "minority discount"-that is, the
value difference between the shares of equivalent cash flow rights held
by public shareholders and by controlling shareholders. The minor-
ity discount in turn affects the feasibility of "equity carve-outs," trans-
actions in which a parent sells a minority interest in a subsidiary via an
5 The literature is summarized in Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Cor-
porate Governance, 58J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000). See also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Fi-
nance, 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining the legal rules protecting corporate
shareholders in common law and civil law countries and hypothesizing that small, di-
versified shareholders are not likely to hold much influence in countries that do not
protect their rights); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J.
FIN. 1131, 1131 (1997) (postulating that countries with poorer investor protections
have smaller and narrower capital markets).
6 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2004) (documenting cross-country differences in
private benefits); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A
Cross-Country Analysis, 68J. FIN. ECON. 325, 342 (2003) (same).
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initial public offering (IPO), and also affects, generally, the value of
control transactions where some shares remain in public hands.
A. Private Benefits of Control in Operating the Company:
The Sinclair Standard
The legal rules governing private benefits of control in operating
a company set the limits on the price of monitoring by a controlling
shareholder. If these limits are effective, the presence of a controlling
shareholder benefits the non-controlling shareholders because the
reduction in managerial agency costs will exceed the level of private
benefits.
Two basic legal rules police the level of private benefits that result
from ongoing operations. First, if the controlling shareholder is a
director, then any contract between the controlling shareholder and
the corporation is an interested transaction and must meet the stan-
dards of statutes like Delaware General Corporation Law section 144, 7
which requires that the transaction be sanitized through either proce-
dural techniques or substantive judicial review.8 If the controlling
7 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001).
8 Delaware General Corporation Law section 144 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its di-
rectors or officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, part-
nership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors
or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void
or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which
authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such director's or
officer's votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in
good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes
of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested
directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or in-
terest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction
is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time
it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a commit-
tee or the shareholders.
Id.; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) ("[W]here an independent
committee is not available [to approve an interested transaction under § 144], the
stockholders may either ratify the transaction or challenge its fairness in a judicial fo-
rum .... ").
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shareholder is not a director, then Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien" applies,
which sets out the general standards for the conduct of controlled
corporations.' ° For this purpose, the Delaware Supreme Court essen-
tially divides sources of private benefits into two categories.
The first category concerns the business and strategic decisions of
the corporation. In Sinclair, for example, a minority shareholder of
Sinven Venezuelan Oil Company, a controlled corporation that oper-
ated primarily in Venezuela, claimed that Sinven's dividend policy fa-
vored the controlling shareholder, Sinclair Oil Corporation." By pay-
ing out as dividends a large percentage of Sinven's profits, Sinven was
alleged to favor the controlling shareholder, which apparently had at-
tractive investment opportunities outside of the controlled corpora-
tion, and to disadvantage the non-controlling shareholders, who re-
ceived equal dividends but lost the opportunity for the controlled
corporation to reinvest its earnings. 12
The second category concerns the core aspect of private bene-
fits-the controlling shareholder's direct dealings with the controlled
corporation. Here we are in the realm of true self-dealing-unfair
transfer pricing, the transfer of assets from the controlled corporation
to the controlling shareholder, and the use of the controlled corpora-
tion's assets as collateral for a controlling shareholder's debt.
The standards established for the two categories of private bene-
fits are radically different. In general, courts treat business and strate-
gic decisions that even-handedly affect the controlling and non-
controlling shareholders essentially as business judgments. Thus, the
Delaware Supreme Court handled the dividend decision in Sinclair, as
well as the related claim that the controlled corporation's business was
limited to the development of oil opportunities in Venezuela (pre-
sumably why the controlled subsidiary was in a position to pay such
9 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
10 See id. at 720 (invoking the intrinsic fairness standard when the fiduciary duty a
parent owes its subsidiary "is accompanied by self-dealing-the situation when a parent
is on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary").
i Id. at 719-21.
12 The dividend may also have had a differential tax impact on minority share-
holders. Depending on whether the subsidiary was part of an affiliated group, at least
eighty percent and as much as one hundred percent of the dividends received by the
parent would not be taxed. See GILSON & BLAcK, supra note 1, at 1239-41 (explaining
the impact of dividend-received deductions on the decision to employ a minority freeze-
out). Minority shareholders would be taxed on dividends received unless they were
otherwise exempt.
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large dividends), as business judgments, and thereby outside the realm
of intrusive judicial review.
3
In contrast, core self-dealing is held to a dramatically different
standard. If the controlling shareholder appears to benefit at the ex-
pense of the controlled corporation (for example, when the control-
ler disparately gains from contract terms or the enforcement of those
terms where the two parties are on opposite sides), the intrinsic fair-
ness standard-the most rigorous in corporate law jurisprudence-
applies. In that situation, the controlling shareholder bears the
burden of proving that the terms of the transaction were intrinsically
fair, with the court making a de novo determination. 4
These two standards thus allow some range of private benefits of
control but, consistent with the minority shareholders' calculus, at a
level that still may make the non-controlling shareholders better 
off.15
What kind of private benefits remain? At the most benign, maintain-
ing a publicly traded, majority-owned subsidiary may benefit the con-
trolling shareholder by more effectively opening the controlled
company's performance to public scrutiny, thereby assuring more ac-
curate pricing of the controlled corporation's business than if it was
bundled with that of the controlling shareholder. Reciprocally, the
controlling shareholder may then make use of market signals to help
assess its own and the controlled corporation's business prospects as
well as the performance of the controlled corporation's management.
Additionally, controlling shareholders may use market signals to de-
vise more accurate incentive compensation for the managementS 16
and employees of both corporations. In these circumstances, the
13 280 A.2d at 722.
14 Id. at 720.
115 The efficacy of these standards is offered by Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 26,
as an explanation for the absence of pyramidal structures in the United States: "Per-
haps the reason that pyramidal group structures are relatively rare in the United States
and the United Kingdom [yet ubiquitous elsewhere in Europe] is that many transac-
tions inside a group would be challenged on fairness grounds by minority shareholders
of subsidiaries, who would get a receptive hearing in court."
16 These reasons are commonly offered as explanations for the efficiency of equity
carve-outs. See Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, A Comparison of Equity Carve-outs and
Seasoned Equity Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructuring, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
153, 182 (1986) ("[T]he equity carve-out may improve public understanding of the
subsidiary's growth opportunities."); see also Anand M. Vijh, The Positive Announcement-
Period Returns of Equity Carveouts: Asymmetric Information or Divestiture Gains?, 75 J. Bus.
153, 189 (2002) ("[T]he market reacts positively to the announcement of carveouts
because it thinks that carveouts create value by divesting unrelated businesses, ena-
bling a complete spinoff or a third-party acquisition, providing new financing, under-
taking new investments, and reducing stock complexity."). Announcement of such
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non-controlling shareholders get more focused monitoring at a rela-
tively low cost.1
7
Other conduct involving private benefits that does not involve
core self-dealing may be more costly. Here we have in mind a variety
of business decisions that, while not rising to the level of business op-
portunities, may provide the controlling shareholder a benefit that
would not otherwise be available to it, even if the controlled corpora-
tion does not directly bear an offsetting cost. These decisions seem to
us to have the character of real options: for example, where the activi-
ties of the controlled corporation may keep open a strategy for the
controlling corporation. 8 Nonetheless, this source of private benefit
remains limited, certainly when compared to core self-dealing.' 9
transactions results in a slightly less than two percent positive abnormal return in the
parent company's stock. See Schipper & Smith, supra, at 153 ("These gains are in con-
trast to the average abnormal loss associated with announcements of seasoned equity
offerings."); see also Heather M. Hulburt et al., Value Creation from Equity Carve-Outs, 31
FIN. MGMT. 83, 99 (2002) (finding that empirical tests support the divestiture gains
hypothesis because "rivals of parent firms exhibit negative stock price reactions to eq-
uity carve-out announcements"). Additional explanations for this gain include the
signal that the parent company's stock is undervalued (otherwise the offering would
have been of parent stock), see Vikram Nanda, On the Good News in Equity Carve-Outs, 46
J. FIN. 1717, 1733 (1991) ("[Tlhe choice of financing decision may provide informa-
tion not just about the subsidiary's assets in place but also about the value of the assets
in place of the rest of the corporation."), and the increased analyst coverage of both
companies' stock, see Stuart C. Gilson et al., Information Effects of Spin-offs, Equity
Carve-outs, and Targeted Stock Offerings 18 (June 1998) (unpublished manuscript)
("Investment bankers.., often argue that the level and quality of analyst coverage sig-
nificantly improves following these transactions."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=42904. In the end, some controversy remains about the
source of abnormal returns. See David Haushalter & Wayne Mikkelson, An Investiga-
tion of the Gains from Specialized Equity: Tracking Stock and Minority Carve-Outs 24
(May 29, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (conjecturing that "the stock price effects
do not reflect real benefits of specialized equity arrangements"), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=271691. For a more skeptical view of
valuation creation by carve-outs and carve-out stability, see Andre Annema et al., When
Carve-outs Make Sense, McKINSEY Q. No. 2, at 13, 15 (2002) (finding that, two years after
the carve-out, most carve-outs "destroy[ed] shareholder value" and warning that
"[c]arving out even small stakes in subsidiaries will likely lead to complete and irre-
versible separation").
17 This statement is consistent with empirical evidence indicating that carve-out
subsidiary stocks do not underperform stock portfolio benchmarks, contrary to the
usual findings of underperformance for IPOs or seasoned equity offerings. Anand M.
Vijh, Long-Term Returnsfrom Equity Carveouts, 51J. FIN. ECON. 273, 275 (1999).
For this purpose it is useful to consider two different kinds of controlling share-
holders:
One group has a unidimensional relation to their portfolio company-that is,
the controlling shareholder's only connection with the company is its share-
holdings. A second group, in contrast, has a multidimensional relation to their
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Finally, there is a level of private benefits extraction that arises
from non-actionable self-dealing. For example, a contract with a con-
trolling shareholder at market prices will still impound market-level
rents and will not reflect savings from reduced information asymme-
tries. The relationship may also entail "micro" self-dealing that in
each instance is small but in the aggregate is significant.
What's important is that judicial doctrine effectively puts a ceiling
on the private benefits of control associated with operating the corpo-
ration. Behavior that has the potential to transfer large amounts of
value is subjected to intense judicial scrutiny, which is consistent with
our hypothesis that controlling shareholders do not take markedly
more from non-controlling shareholders than they provide. 2  Thus,
the level of private benefits from operations provides a benchmark for
assessing the standards governing alternative methods of securing pri-
vate benefits.
B. Sale of Control at a Premium
The second method by which a controlling shareholder may ex-
tract private benefits of control is by selling its control for a premium
that reflects the capitalized value of the private benefits of control
available from operating the controlled corporation. Although the
holding in Perlman v. Feldmann -that a controlling shareholder can-
not sell control at a premium that is not shared with non-controlling
22shareholders -continues to amuse corporate law teachers (both be-
cause it provides the basis for an interesting class and because of the
Second Circuit's Fantasia-like view of Indiana law), by the early 1990s,
portfolio-that is, in addition to the controlling shareholder's stock position,
it also has an operational relation to the company, for example, as customer
or supplier.
... A unidimensional controlling shareholder has few channels by which
to appropriate private benefits [from the controlled corporation].
GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1233. For the unidimensional controlling share-
holder, real options may be the primary source of private benefits. Id. at 1233-34.
19 Id. at 1233-34.
20 John Coates is more pessimistic with respect to the potential size of private
benefits that controlling shareholders can secure through operations. See John C.
Coates IV, "Fair Value" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict
Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1314-27 (1999) (contending that controllers can
readily shift value from controlled subsidiaries). However, much of Coates's focus is
on whether value-reducing operational decisions that affect all shareholders can be
transmuted into private benefits in a freeze-out as a result of valuation standards. Id.
21 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
22 Id. at 178.
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the applicable legal rule was radically different. Whether one looks to
Delaware case law13 or to the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles
24of Corporate Governance, the rule is clear: in general, a controlling
shareholder can sell control at a premium that is not shared with non-
controlling shareholders.
Given the limits on private benefits of control from ongoing op-
erations, it seems clear that non-controlling shareholders would pre-
fer a rule that allows controlling shareholders the right to sell their
shares at a price that reflects the net present value of the flow of pri-
vate benefits from operating the company.z Correspondingly, a buyer
of control presumably would not wish to acquire the controlled cor-
poration at a price that reflects the capitalized value of private benefits
unless it thought it could increase the value of its purchased interest.
Because the amount of private benefits from operating the controlled
corporation is capped by the legal rule applicable in that situation, the
non-controlling shareholders will share any increase in value resulting
from an increase in the common value of the controlled corpora-
26tion.
23 The court in Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 234 (Del. Ch. 1990), stated that,
"[w]hile Delaware law has not addressed this specific question, one is not left without
guidance from our decided cases.... [It] is [a] principle [of Delaware law] that a
shareholder has a right to sell his or her stock and in the ordinary case owes no duty in
that connection to other shareholders when acting in good faith." See also Thorpe v.
CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 442 (Del. 1996) (distinguishing the fiduciary relation-
ship between directors and the corporation from the relationship between controlling
shareholders and other shareholders); In re Sea-Land Corp. S'holders Litig., No. 8453,
1987 WL 11283, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987) ("A controlling stockholder is generally
under no duty to refrain from receiving a premium upon the sale of his controlling
stock."); cf Robert W. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand To-
day, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 248, 249 (1985) ("It is unlikely that any American court
today would reject the general proposition that controlling shareholders may obtain a
premium for their shares which they need not share with other shareholders.").
24 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.16
(1994).
25 This discussion draws on GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1231-32, which in
turn was informed by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 711 (1982) (arguing that minority shareholders want a
rule that increases the market value of shares in the corporation). See also Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q.J. ECON. 957, 974-81
(1994) (comparing the market rule with the equal opportunity rule in the context of
corporate control transfers); Marcel Kahan, Sales of Corporate Contro 9 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 368, 378 (1993) (analyzing the legal rules governing the sale of corporate con-
trol).
26 An empirical study of Perlman v. Feldmann showed that the stock of Newport
Steel, the controlled corporation, experienced abnormal returns of thirty-four percent
during negotiations for sale of control and abnormal returns of seventy-seven percent
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Next, assume that the new controller realizes certain synergies from
its operation of the controlled corporation. Does this change the le-
gal rule that non-controlling shareholders would choose? We think
not. So long as the legal rules governing private benefits of control
from operations do not allow all of the synergy to be captured by the
controlling shareholder, the non-controlling shareholders will par-
ticipate in the value increase resulting from the sale of control. This is
a plausible assumption given that actually achieving synergy will re-
quire direct interaction between the controlling shareholder and the
controlled corporation, an interaction that will be subject to Sinclair.1
7
There are exceptions to the permissive general rule, but these
seem to fit well within the present analysis. Section 5.16 of the ALI
Principles of Corporate Governance states these exceptions. 28 The general
rule that a controlling shareholder can sell its shares at a premium is
qualified in two circumstances: first, when the controlling share-
holder acquires shares from non-controlling shareholders in anticipa-
tion of the contemplated sale of control without disclosure and, sec-
ond, when it is apparent that the purchaser is likely to extract illegal
levels of private benefits from operating the controlled corporation.29
(twenty-nine percent on an industry-adjusted basis) over the entire year during which
control was sold. MichaelJ. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, The Law and Large-Block
Trades, 35J.L. & ECON. 265, 270-71, 270 n.7 (1992). Because market price measures
the value of the public minority shares, the data suggest that the minority shareholders
benefited from the sale of control. The experience of Newport's non-controlling
shareholders seems to be a generalizable one.
On the other hand, it is also possible to see Perlman v. Feldmann as correctly de-
cided on its own peculiar facts, namely the Korean War price controls that produced a
valuation gap between the capped wholesale price of steel and the value of the steel to
end-users, whose products were not price-capped. 219 F.2d at 175. To try to capture
this difference, Newport had insisted that customers provide advances against future
purchases, i.e., interest free loans. Id. at 177. Even if the end-users who acquired con-
trol of Newport continued to make these advances on their purchases, if the present
value of the interest-rate differential was less than the steel-product valuation gap, then
at least part of the control premium can be considered a form of special synergy gain
that, because it was not ratably shared with the minority, was properly subject to recov-
ery.
27 See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards
imposed by Sinclair.
28 PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.16
(1994).
29 Section 5.16 (a) and (b) restrict a controlling shareholder's right to sell control
at a premium if:
(a) The controlling shareholder does not make disclosure concerning the
transaction to other shareholders with whom the controlling shareholder
deals in connection with the transaction; or
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The first exception operates merely as a form of insider trading regu-
lation. The second backstops the rule, limiting the level of private
benefits from operations. In circumstances of looting, the controlling
shareholder may be judgment proof. The exceptions provide an al-
ternative source of recovery when the seller of control should have
known what was coming.
In short, the legal rule governing receipt of private benefits
through sale of control fits nicely with the legal rule governing the
level of private benefits from ongoing operations of the company.
Except when there is reason to believe that the operating rules will be
violated following the sale, there is no reason for a more restrictive
rule. Put differently, if the stream of private benefits from operations
is effectively controlled, there is no need to regulate the transfer of its
• • 30
capitalized value.
C. Freeze-out of Minority Shareholders
The third method by which a controlling shareholder can extract
private benefits of control is through freezing out minority sharehold-
ers at a market price that reflects a discount equivalent to the private
benefits of control available from operating the controlled corpora-
tion. In contrast to the simple permissive rules governing the sale of
control at a premium, the rules governing minority freeze-outs are
both complex and restrictive.
The modern law of minority freeze-outs dates to the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 1 In that case, the
(b) It is apparent from the circumstances that the purchaser is likely to violate
the duty of fair dealing.., in such a way as to obtain a significant financial
benefit for the purchaser or an associate.
Id. § 5.16(a)-(b) (citations omitted).
30 Thus, one way to understand "mandatory bid" systems that are common to take-
over practice in the European Union, see infta note 115 (last paragraph), which give
public minority shareholders an exit right upon an acquisition of control, is in terms of
the differential capacity of legal systems to articulate and enforce minority shareholder
rights.
31 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). The present historical account relegates Delaware's
flirtation with a business purpose test as a precondition to a freeze-out-announced in
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975-76 & n.5, 982 (Del. 1977) (apparently in re-
sponse to pressure from the federal courts) and overruled in Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
715-to accounts more concerned with the impact of federalist considerations on the
development of corporate law. For one such account, see GILSON & BLACK, supra note
1, at 1254-69. See also MarkJ. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588, 600
(2003) (asserting that Delaware's race is not with other states, but with the risk of fed-
eral preemption).
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Signal Companies determined to acquire the 49.5% of UOP that it did
not own through a merger in which the UOP shareholders would re-
ceive cash for their UOP stock.3 Although Signal was prepared to pay
up to $24 per share for the stock, the UOP board agreed to accept $21
per share, an approximately fifty percent premium over the market
price of UOP stock.3 - The court treated the freeze-out transaction as a
simple manifestation of the core self-dealing conduct that requires in-
tensive judicial review of the transaction terms for fairness.34 Because
the lower the price Signal paid to UOP shareholders, the better off it
was, and because Signal had benefited by its receipt of a feasibility
study prepared by Signal's UOP directors to the detriment of the UOP
minority, the transaction simply presented a variation of the typical
scenario that triggers heightened review of operating transactions un-
der Sinclair.5 Consistent with the general principle that a controlling
shareholder is cut no slack in its dealings with a controlled corpora-
tion, the court stressed that Signal-designated directors of UOP
should be held to the same standard as non-Signal directors; conflict-
ing loyalties had to be resolved in favor of the controlled corpora-
36tion.
Having established that a freeze-out triggered intensive judicial
review of the transaction's fairness, the court went on to delineate the
terms of that review. "Fairness," the court explained, consists of the
process by which the transaction is negotiated: "fair dealing" together
32 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 705.
33 Id. at 705-06.
34 Id. at 710.
35 "Self-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidi-
ary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from
the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the
subsidiary." Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
36 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (relying on "the long-existing principle of Dela-
ware law that these Signal designated directors on UOP's board still owed UOP and its
shareholders an uncompromising duty of loyalty").. In the post-Weinberger evolution of
freeze-outs, the inherent tensions in a transaction proposed by a controller, who either
has the necessary voting power to accomplish the transaction or, if the transaction is
conditioned on a majority of minority approval, will remain in control even if the mi-
nority refuses, have led to the imposition of entire fairness review in all such freeze-
outs; no explicit taking advantage of minority shareholders is required. See Kahn v.
Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994) (requiring entire
fairness review when a controlling or dominating shareholder stands on both sides of
the transaction); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) ("' [T]he
requirement of fairness is unflinching... where one stands on both sides of a transac-
tion, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts."' (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710)).
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with "fair price." 7 With respect to fair dealing, the court stressed both
the obligation of candor on the part of the parent s and the impor-
tance of a process that mirrors a real arm's-length transaction in
which each party has the right to say "no."3 9 As to fair price, the court
adopted for this purpose the liberalized appraisal standard previously
adopted by the Delaware legislature.4°
Unfortunately, the court provided no real guidance as to how the
two elements of fairness interacted. On the one hand, Weinberger can
be read as suggesting that, if the parent allowed the subsidiary to es-
tablish an independent negotiating committee that had the right to
say "no," the court could then infer that the price resulting from
arm's-length bargaining was also fair. Alternatively, however, the
court simultaneously and unhelpfully stressed that "the test for fair-
ness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All as-
pects of the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is
one of entire fairness."
41
The importance of this confusion cannot be overemphasized. For
this purpose, it is important to keep in mind what is at stake. Con-
trolled corporation shareholders already have a remedy if they believe
the price to be paid in a cash-out merger is too low: an appraisal pro-
ceeding with precisely the same measure of value as that adopted
by the Weinberger court.42 The difference between the two remedies
is technically procedural, but ultimately of enormous substantive con-
sequence. Under the Delaware appraisal procedure, a shareholder
must jump through a number of procedural hoops, including not
37 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
38 Id.
39 In an oft-cited footnote, the court stated that
the result here could have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an
independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with Signal
at arm's length. Since fairness in this context can be equated to conduct by a
theoretical, wholly independent, board of directors acting upon the matter
before them, it is unfortunate that this course apparently was neither consid-
ered nor pursued. Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that
the action taken was as though each of the contending parties had in fact ex-
erted its bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong evidence
that the transaction meets the test of fairness.
Id. at 709 n.7 (citations omitted).
40 Id. at 703-04; see also DEL. CODE ANT. tit. 8, § 262 (Supp. 1982) (current version
at tit. 8, § 262 (2001)).
41 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. The court's reasoning is unclear. Suppose the price
is entirely fair, but the process is faulty. To what else are shareholders entitled beyond
a fair price?
42 Id. at 703-04.
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voting for the transaction and not accepting payment, in order to
retain the right to bring an appraisal action.43 More importantly, the
Delaware corporate statute does not authorize a class appraisal proce-
dure. 4 In contrast, a breach of fiduciary duty claim can be brought
on behalf of all subsidiary shareholders regardless of how they voted
or whether they accepted payment for their shares.4  Thus, the eco-
nomics of the litigation process mean that, if a fight about price is lim-
ited to appraisal, the controlling shareholder is exposed as to price
only with respect to the number of shares for which appraisal rights
are perfected, typically a quite small number. Moreover, the control-
ler can manage its potential risk by conditioning its obligation to close
the merger on a certain level of shareholder approval. In a class ac-
tion under the Weinberger standard, however, the price exposure ex-
tends to all shares acquired through the freeze-out merger without the
46
need for shareholders to take any action at all .
Finally, if the freeze-out merger consideration is stock in the con-
troller or stock in any publicly traded corporation, the minority
shareholders have no right to appraisal. 4' Thus, without a cause of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty, the minority shareholders in such a
transaction may have no remedy at all.
What remained open after Weinberger, then, was the procedural
key. If the parent adopts an arm's-length negotiating structure, in-
cluding an independent negotiating committee with a right to say
"no," and receives the approval of a majority of the minority share-
holders, does the standard of review shift to business judgment
and therefore relegate shareholders to their appraisal rights as the
43 § 262(a).
44 Id.
4 See Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1111 (Del. 1994)
(noting that the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all shareholders of the ac-
quired company whose stock had been procured through the merger).
46 See GILSON & BLAcK, supra note 1, at 1266-69 (discussing the differences be-
tween appraisal actions and other claims). In Andra v. Blount, 772 A.2d 183, 183-84
(Del. Ch. 2000), Vice Chancellor Strine confronted the critical procedural consequence
of a plaintiff's successfully invoking entire fairness review of a freeze-out merger in the
context of applying standing as a barrier to entire fairness review. See also Clements v.
Rogers, 790 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Del. Ch. 2001) (confronting a similar procedural conse-
quence with respect to the acquiescence doctrine).
47 § 262(b)(2). If, however, the controller owns at least ninety percent of the
target's stock and uses the short-form merger procedure under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 253 (2001), then the minority shareholders have appraisal rights irrespective of the
consideration. § 262(b) (3).
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Weinberger court suggested in footnote 7?48 Alternatively, would the
appraisal measure of value nonetheless be applied on a class basis be-
cause, as the Weinberger court also explained, "the test for fairness is
not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price ?49 This and
related issues were more or less clearly worked out in two Delaware
Supreme Court opinions, Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.
(Kahn 1) 50 and Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc. (Kahn II),5'
involving Alcatel U.S.A. Corporation's freeze-out of non-controlling
shareholders in Lynch Communication Systems, Inc.
Kahn I plainly resolved the issues at stake in structuring the ap-
proval process of a freeze-out merger. The court considered a per-
fectly sensible argument that entire fairness review should not apply,
and therefore shareholders would be remitted to an appraisal remedy,S 52
if the negotiating structure plausibly protected their interests -as,
for example, where the merger terms met the approval of a fully
empowered, independent negotiating committee and the merger
was conditioned upon approval by the majority of the disinterested• - 53
minority. Where the procedure approximated an arm's-length ne-
gotiation, no special judicial review would be appropriate, and the
business judgment standard would apply. Furthermore, it would
follow that the frozen-out shareholders would be held to their deci-
sion regarding the pursuit of appraisal. Instead, the Kahn I court held
that adopting such a negotiating structure served only to shift the
burden of proof to the plaintiff on the issue of the freeze-out's fair-
ness. The court believed that the controlling shareholder retained
the capacity to influence the minority that cannot be procedurally
48 457 A.2d at 709 n.7. See supra note 39 for the footnote quotation.
49 457 A.2d at 711.
50 638 A.2d at 1117.
51 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1995).
52 See Kahn 1, 638 A.2d at 1115 (discussing the possibility that approval of a cash-
out merger by a committee of interested directors "renders the business judgment rule
the applicable standard ofjudicial review").
51 In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988):
Both the device of the special negotiating committee of disinterested directors
and the device of a merger provision requiring approval by a majority of disin-
terested shareholders, when properly employed, have the judicial effect of
making the substantive law aspect of the business judgment rule applicable
and, procedurally, of shifting back to plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating
that such a transaction infringes upon rights of minority shareholders.
54 638 A.2d at 1117.
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dissipated. In effect, the court envisioned an implicit threat that, if
the non-controlling shareholders did not approve the freeze-out, the
controlling shareholder would exercise its operating discretion to
their disadvantage!"; In Kahn I itself, the court found that Alcatel had
coerced the independent negotiating committee set up by Lynch
Communications by threatening to proceed with a tender offer at a
lower price if the committee continued to resist.57 The court re-
manded the case to the chancery court to determine the transaction's
entire fairness. 8
Kahn I left open two important issues. First, what happens if the
transaction structure fails this initial fair-dealing inquiry and therefore
does not operate to shift the burden of proof? If a transaction has to
exhibit both fair dealing and fair price to be entirely fair, then how
can the fairness standard ever ultimately be satisfied if, as in
Kahn I, the fair-dealing component is not met? Second, why should a
controlling shareholder allow the creation of a fully empowered nego-
tiating committee if all it gets in return is a burden shift? Unless the
evaluation of price is somehow different-even without the presump-
tions of business judgment review-as a result of procedural protec-
tions, what is in it for the controlling shareholder?59
On remand, the chancery court found that the transaction satis-
fied both the fair-dealing and fair-price components of the entire
fairness review. ° As has been suggested, finding that the fair-dealing
component was satisfied, despite the controlling shareholder's coer-
cion of the independent negotiating committee, required some fast-
talking. On appeal, the supreme court's assessment of fair dealing
took an unacknowledged but major shift. While in Kahn I the inquiry
55 Id. at 1116-17.
56 "'The controlling stockholder relationship has the [sic] potential to influence,
however subtly, the vote of [ratifying] minority stockholders in a manner that is not
likely to occur in a transaction with a noncontrolling party."' Id. at 1116 (quoting Cit-
ron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502 (Del. Ch. 1990)). In making
this statement, the court appears unaware that this "inherent coercion" can exist only
to the extent that judicial review of the controlling shareholder's operating decisions
fails to control private benefit extraction.
57 See id. at 1118 (stating that the independent negotiating committee had "full
knowledge of Alcatel's demonstrated pattern of domination" while considering Al-
catel's proposal to purchase Lynch Communications).
58 Id. at 1121-22.
59 See In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 20341, 2003 WL 21961453, at *15-16
(Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2003) (concluding that burden-shifting, particularly on "fair value,"
is not generally material either at the pleading stage or at trial).
CI Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 83.
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was whether the independent negotiating committee had been co-
erced, in Kahn II the inquiry shifted to whether the non-controlling
shareholders voting on the freeze-out merger were coerced.6' Despite
the finding that "the specter of coercion" had impaired the function-
ing of the independent negotiating committee, the court concluded
that "[w] here other economic forces are at work and more likely pro-
duced the decision to sell," this coercion still
may not be deemed material with respect to the transaction as a whole,
and will not prevent a finding of entire fairness. In this case, no share-
holder was treated differently... nor subjected to a two-tiered or
squeeze-out treatment.... Clearly there was no coercion exerted which
62
was material to this aspect of the transaction ....
Putting Kahn I and Kahn II together, we are left with something
like a two-tiered inquiry concerning the fair-dealing component of the
entire fairness standard. With respect to whether the burden of proof
on entire fairness has shifted to the plaintiff, the appropriate inquiry
assesses the presence and true empowerment of an independent ne-• 63
gotiating committee. Fairly read, Kahn I holds that the burden of
proof does not shift unless the independent negotiating committee
has the right to prevent the transaction.64 With respect to the ultimate
determination of whether the transactional procedure satisfies the
fair-dealing component, the inquiry shifts to whether the inherent co-
ercion and the form of the transaction actually influenced the non-
controlling shareholders' votes. Characterized somewhat less than
sympathetically, is fair dealing satisfied despite an unfair, but not
structurally coercive, procedure?
65
That leaves the issue of the stakes associated with establishing an
empowered special committee. Will the assessment of fair price be
influenced by the extent to which the transaction structure attempts
61 See id. at 86 (holding that the coercion found by the court in Kahn I did not
have a "material" influence on the shareholders' decision to sell and, therefore, was
not indicative of unfair dealing).
62 Id. (citation omitted).
63 How to design a fully empowered, independent negotiating committee is itself
an interesting issue. See GILSON & BLAcK, supra note 1, at 1303-05 (speculating as to
what negotiating procedures will satisfy the fair-dealing requirement after Kahn I).
See supra text accompanying note 54 (describing the court's holding that an
arm's-length negotiating structure shifts the burden of proof).
65 By contrast, a violation of the duty of candor does appear to result in a per se
failure of the entire fairness standard. See Ince & Co. v. Silgan Corp., No. 10941, 1991
WL 17171, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 1991) (stating that "entire fairness includes the obli-
gation 'to disclose with entire candor all material facts concerning the merger"' (quot-
ing Sealy Mattress Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1987))).
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to dissipate the specter of coercion? The answer to that question re-
mains opaque, largely because of the court's continued insistence on
the "non-bifurcated standard of Weinberger."66 There is, however, a spec-
ter of judicial coercion with respect to the link between procedure
and price. Although Weinberger eliminated the free option that arose
out of Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,67 which held that failing the entire
fairness standard exposed the controlling shareholder to the equita-
ble remedy of the monetary equivalent of rescission, 6 and the court in
the seemingly endless Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 9 litigation read
the appraisal standard in section 262 to include significant elements
70of post-transaction value, Weinberger continued to hold out the pros-
pect of equitable relief beyond the appraisal standard.7 Thus, the
court has left room for a link between procedure and damages, with
an appropriate incentive effect.
D. Summary
The doctrinal origami of the limits on controlling shareholders
presents a clear but complex pattern. The rule governing the extrac-
tion of private benefits of control limits large wealth transfers from
non-controlling to controlling shareholders by imposing rigorous
judicial review of self-dealing transactions between the controlling
shareholder and the controlled company, while still leaving room
for a range of private benefits that may be more beneficial to the con-
trolling shareholder than costly to the controlled company and that
6 Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 90. The court's reference to "a disciplined balancing ap-
proach" following its mention of the non-bifurcated standard in Kahn II, id., appears to
contemplate an undisciplined tradeoff between procedure and price that seems to as-
sure the continued pattern of fully litigating every freeze-out transaction.
67 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (awarding the plaintiff rescissory damages for the con-
trolling shareholder's breach of fiduciary duty in a tender offer, rather than the ap-
praisal damages typically awarded to minority shareholders injured in sales to control-
ling parties); see also GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1269 (discussing the option-like
effect of differing damage standards in appraisal and entire fairness proceedings).
68 429 A.2d at 501; see also Weinberger, 457 A.2d 701, 703-04, 714 (Del. 1983) (over-
ruling Lynch by holding that appraisal, and not rescissory damages, is the appropriate
remedy for minority shareholders in freeze-out mergers).
69 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
70 Id. at 299-300.
71 457 A.2d at 714 ("While a plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily should be con-
fined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding herein established, we do not in-
tend any limitation on the historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief
as the facts of a particular case may dictate.").
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may support the more focused monitoring of the managerial agency
problem available to a controlling shareholder.
In turn, the rule governing the extraction of the capitalized value
of the private benefits from operations through the sale of control is
both simple and permissive. Because of the restrictions on the extrac-
tion of private benefits from operations (which continue to allow a
level of private benefits consistent with focused monitoring), an ac-
quirer of control must ordinarily improve the performance of the
controlled corporation in order to profit from its investment. Achiev-
ing this improvement requires two inputs: the capabilities of the new
controlling shareholder and the existing business of the controlled
corporation. Because the non-controlling shareholders remain par-
ticipants in the controlled corporation, the gain that results from this
bilateral monopoly is shared more or less proportionately. Judicial in-
tervention is limited to those circumstances where either there is an
observable risk that the purchaser of control will exceed the level of
allowed private benefits from operation or there has been fraud in the
interaction between the selling controlling shareholder and non-
controlling shareholders in anticipation of the control sale.
In contrast, the rules that limit extracting the capitalized value of
the private benefits of control through freezing out the non-
controlling shareholders are both complex and restrictive. This dif-
ference emerges because, unlike with a sale of control, non-
controlling shareholders will not automatically participate in any value
increase as a result of the freeze-out. This discrepancy results in an
incentive for controlling shareholders to manipulate the operation of
the controlled corporation and the market price of its stock in antici-
pation of the transaction, subject to the limits imposed by the Sinclair
standard.72 It also can leave the non-controlling shareholders with no
benefit from the post-transaction increase in value even though an in-
put in which they have an interest is necessary to achieve that increase.
Requiring an independent negotiating committee and more rigorous
judicial review serves to ensure that the non-controlling shareholders
receive some portion of the gain that would result from bargaining in
a bilateral monopoly.
73
72 Sinclair, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971), would not restrict poor decisions that
reduce value generally. To the extent that the effects of such decisions may not be re-
versible, the potential for manipulation is real.
73 There is no obvious reason to believe that giving all the gain to one side
or another in a bilateral monopoly is necessary in order to achieve an efficient level
of transactions. From the perspective of either participant, any value above the
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II. DISTURBING THE SYMMETRY: THE DIGEX AND
SILICONiX LINES OF CASES
To this point, we have argued that the Delaware doctrine seeking
to control the level of private benefits enjoyed by controlling share-
holders reflects a sensible symmetry between the three alternative
methods by which these benefits can be extracted: through ongoing
operations, by a sale of control, or by a freeze-out. As our discussion
of the case law reflects, we do not assert that this symmetry is the result
of grand design. Rather, we believe only that, when rules governing
one or another alternative get out of line, transaction planners are
quick to adjust their strategies to compensate, such that the Delaware
Chancery Court sees the implications of its previous decisions quickly
and is promptly given the opportunity to adjust the rules and restore
14balance. We also do not assert that the pattern necessarily reflects a
fully efficient equilibrium that can be reflected in complex equations.
Rather, we suggest only that the pattern reflects a rough but workable
solution, not necessarily any worse than the results of an effort to
mathematically model the solution to three simultaneous equations
under restrictive assumptions.
Our recognition of the overall structure's viability should not,
however, imply that we believe the Delaware courts always get it
reservation price is a rent. Lucian Bebchuk and Alan Schwartz discuss this issue as it
pertains to the takeover context in an interesting, albeit lengthy, debate. For examples
of their arguments, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers: A Last (?) Reply, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 256 (1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 228 (1988); Alan
Schwartz, Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 271, 271 (1986); Alan
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 229, 244
(1986); Alan Schwartz, The Sole Owner Standard Reviewed, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 234
(1988).
74 Ronald Gilson and Bernard Black describe "[t]his drastic telescoping of the
common law process" with respect to takeovers in the 1980s: "Each new decision was
reflected in the tactics of the next transaction; the Chancery Court often had to con-
front the 'next case' on a motion for preliminary injunction soon after the initial deci-
sion." GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 4. We do not intend this analysis as a strong
claim for the efficiency of the common law of corporations. We do, however, think
that the claim for efficiency is likely the strongest here, where the rules concern an on-
going pattern of transactions and where professionals view their role as involving con-
tinual adjustment of transactional structures to reflect new judicial decisions. This ex-
plicit interaction between case law and transaction structure is plainly visible in the
latter line of cases we discuss in this Part. See also John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subra-
manian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307,
328-37 (2000) (documenting the rapid shift from stock options to breakup fees in
friendly mergers following an adverse Delaware Supreme Court ruling on stock op-
tions).
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right. These are complicated and difficult matters with, as we have
tried to show, a lot of moving parts. Moreover, the case law does not
acknowledge the simultaneity of the three doctrinal lines, which
makes maintaining their symmetry that much harder. Thus, mistakes
happen. The role of commentary is to identify these glitches and offerS 75
suggestions as to how they can be rectified.
In this Part, we focus on what we believe to be two such glitches
that go to the center of the symmetry developed in Part I. The first,
76the chancery court decision of In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
deals with the rules governing private benefit extraction through the
sale of control, and the second, the line of cases following In re Sili-•• . 77
conix Inc. Shareholders Litigation, deals with the rules governing private
benefit extraction through freeze-outs. Recognition of the relation-
ship between the three doctrinal areas that control controlling share-
holders' extraction of private benefits suggests that, in each, the chan-
cery court is moving in the wrong direction. More particularly, Digex
threatens to interfere with the controller's right to retain a control
premium in the sale of control, and the Siliconix line of cases threatens
to reduce minority protections in freeze-out transactions in a way that
will enhance the controller's take beyond the permitted level of pri-
vate benefits.
A. Digex: New Restrictions on Sale of Control at a Premium
The controversy in Digex now seems terribly dated. The transac-
tion began with a contest between WorldCom, Inc. and Global Cross-
ing, Ltd. to acquire Intermedia Communications, Inc., a telecommu-
nications company, and/or Digex, Inc., Intermedia's controlled
subsidiary in the web hosting business, said to be "well positioned in
one of the hottest segments of the technology sector .... 78 World-
Com won the contest, having made clear "that WorldCom would out-
bid anyone for Digex."7 9 The legal issues were posed by the conflict
between Intermedia and Digex shareholders over which group would
receive the WorldCom stock that would be the consideration in the
acquisition.
75 This is a much easier job, we recognize, than trying to get the answer both right
and written in the amount of time typically available to the chancery court.
76 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000).
77 No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch.June 19, 2001).
78 Digex, 789 A.2d at 1181.
79 Id. at 1184.
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While the facts leading up to the transaction are complex, the
central issue can be stated briefly. After initially considering a direct
acquisition of Digex, WorldCom decided instead to acquire control of
Digex indirectly, by acquiring Intermedia. ° The two alternatives had
dramatically different impacts on Intermedia and Digex, at least in the
first instance. If WorldCom acquired Intermedia, Intermedia's share-
holders would receive the control premium associated with Digex.8
Alternatively, if WorldCom acquired Digex, the control premium
would be shared between Intermedia and Digex's non-controlling
shareholders. After some initial uncertainty, WorldCom decided to
acquire Intermedia, thereby succeeding to Intermedia's control of Di-
83
gex. Neither Digex nor its shareholders would be a party to the
transaction.
There was, however, one complication. WorldCorn wanted the
Digex board of directors, composed of four Intermedia representa-
tives and three independents, to grant WorldCom a waiver of section
84203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, Delaware's business
combination statute.' This provision prohibits an acquirer of more
than fifteen percent of a target's shares from engaging in a range
of interested transactions with the target, including a freeze-out
merger, for a period of three years unless the target company's board
80 Id. at 1184-85.
81 Id. at 1183.
82 Id. This difference extended to the personal positions of Intermedia represen-
tatives who constituted a majority of Digex's board. All had significant ownership posi-
tions in Intermedia but comparatively small or no ownership interests in Digex. Id. at
1181 n.5.
83 Id. at 1187. The plaintiffs claimed that, and the chancery court devoted sub-
stantial attention to determining whether, Intermedia had somehow usurped a Digex
corporate opportunity by diverting WorldCom's initial interest in acquiring Digex to
an acquisition of Intermedia. Id. at 1188-94. While the chancery court correctly held
that Digex had no independent opportunity because of Intermedia's control, id. at
1189-92, we think the court made the issue harder than it needed to be. So long as no
acquisition of Digex could occur without Intermedia's approval, the manner in which
WorldCom expressed its preference for acquisition of Intermedia should be beside the
point. While a properly scripted exchange would have referred WorldCom to the Di-
gex board while also expressing Intermedia's position that it would not approve an ac-
quisition of Digex, the outcome hardly should turn on invariably conflicting evidence
regarding the terms of the actual conversation. Since Intermedia had the uncontested
right not to approve a Digex acquisition, any further inquiry on this point should have
been unnecessary.
84 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).
85 Digex, 789 A.2d at 1185.
808 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW
of directors preapproves the acquirer's initial share acquisition or an-
other exemption applies.86
This account sets up the issue. There was no doubt that Interme-
dia was free to structure the transaction, so it could sell control of Di-
gex without sharing the premium with non-controlling Digex share-
holders. But what happens when Digex is asked to participate in the
transaction by waiving the application of section 203?
At the Digex board meeting held to consider the waiver, the
board voted four to three to approve the waiver, conditioned on the
amendment of Digex's articles of incorporation to require that Digex
independent directors approve any post-acquisition material transac-
tion between WorldCom and Digex.8 7  The vote broke down along
party lines. The three independent directors voted against the waiver,
while the four Intermedia-affiliated directors voted in its favor, after
rejecting the position advanced by counsel to the independent direc-
tors that they recuse themselves due to conflicts of interest.
88
Because the Intermedia-affiliated directors were hopelessly con-
flicted, the court treated the section 203 waiver as a straightforward
interested transaction between a parent and subsidiary to which the
entire fairness standard applied.89 At this point the court's analysis got
interesting. Although Intermedia could sell control of Digex without
Digex's participation, it could not grant a waiver of section 203 with-
out action by the Digex board.0 This restriction changed the position
of the parties. As the court put it, "[t]he waiver had value and granted
some degree of bargaining leverage to Digex."' The failure on the
part of the Intermedia-affiliated members of the Digex board to exert
86 § 203. Intermedia claimed that another exemption applied, one for acquisi-
tions in which the acquirer went from owning less than fifteen percent to owning more
than eighty-five percent of the target company's voting stock. Digex, 789 A.2d at 1197;
see also § 203(a) (2) (detailing the exemption). The problem was that Intermedia held
only fifty-two percent of Digex's equity but ninety-four percent of its voting power. Id.
at 1181. Thus, if section 203's statutory term "voting stock" referred to voting power,
then WorldCom's acquisition was exempt from section 203 and the issue of whether
the Digex board properly waived section 203 was irrelevant. Id. at 1198. Alternatively,
if the statutory percentage referred to ownership of the target's equity, a Digex board
waiver would be necessary. Id. The chancery court held that the statute required an
eighty-five percent equity position in order for the acquirer to be exempt, making the
board waiver critical. Id. at 1199.
87 Digex, 789 A.2d at 1209.
88 Id. at 1187.
89 Id. at 1206.
98 Id. at 1214.
91 Id. at 1205.
[Vol. 152: 785
2003] CONTROLLING CONTROLLING SHAREHOIDERS 809
this leverage on behalf of Digex non-controlling shareholders was then
held to violate the entire fairness standard. 2
Without more, this is an unremarkable result. The Intermedia-
affiliated directors were on both sides of a transaction between Inter-
media and Digex. The facts hardly support a claim of fair dealing,S 93
and the fair-price inquiry is not much more complicated. While
there were acknowledged advantages to be gained by Digex from the
substitution of WorldCom for Intermedia"4 -this was the prototypical
transaction where sale of control resulted in an improvement for the
non-controlling shareholders-it would have been hard for the court
to conclude that the charter amendment was all that could have been
extracted from WorldCom had the Digex board exerted itself.
Thus, if Digex stands for no more than the proposition that a cor-
poration's board must bargain on behalf of minority shareholders
when a statute requires the corporation's cooperation in connection
with a sale of control by its controlling shareholder, then the result is
unremarkable. For better or worse, the statute simply limits the con-
trol that the controlling shareholder can sell. If the acquirer does not
care about section 203, then nothing changes. If it does, then the
bargaining becomes three-way. This may be an unintended conse-
quence of section 203, but in that event, the legislature is free to
95amend the statute.
92 Id. at 1214.
93 See id. at 1211-14 (examining the fair-price question and concluding that the
behavior of the interested directors clearly disadvantaged the Digex shareholders).
94 "[P]laintiffs do not dispute that WorldCom is a good fit in many respects, vastly
superior to Intermedia in many ways, or that Digex strongly desired to be rid of Inter-
media's restrictive presence." Id. at 1213.
95 Indeed, the legislature in 2002 amended the Delaware Code's general defini-
tion of "voting stock" to clarify that, contrary to the Digex court's view, the relevant
metric in section 203 (and elsewhere) should be "voting power." Act ofJune 20, 2002,
secs. 4, 6-8, §§ 203(a)(2), 203(c)(8), 212(a), 223(c), 73 Del. Laws 298, 298 (2002).
Section 203(c)(8) was amended to say, "Every reference to a percentage of voting
stock shall refer to such percentage of the votes of such voting stock." Id. at sec. 6,
§ 203(c)(8). In addition, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2001), which was
amended to say, "[E]very reference in this chapter to a majority or other proportion of
stock, voting stock or shares shall refer to such majority or other proportion of the
votes of such stock, voting stock or shares." Act of June 20, 2002, sec. 7, § 212(a), 73
Del. Laws 298, 298 (2002). See generally Act of June 20, 2002 (synopsis authored by
Sen. Adams) ("The amendments to Sections 203(a) (2), 203(c) (8), 212(a) and 223(c)
clarify that references to 'voting stock' or 'shares' therein and elsewhere in the title,
including in Sections 203, 223 and 253, are intended to adopt the voting power con-
cept reflected in Section 212(a).").
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A more serious problem arises if Digex is something more than an
artifact of section 203. A realistic look at sale of control transactions
suggests that the controlled corporation often will be involved in the
sale in some fashion. Two points on the continuum of corporate
involvement in the controlling shareholder's sale illustrate the prob-
lem.
First, consider the problem of due diligence. The acquirer of con-
trol typically will wish to undertake its own investigation of the corpo-
ration whose control it is buying. This necessarily will include access
to information that is not otherwise public. Digex itself reveals the
transaction pattern. When Intermedia's investment banker was shop-
ping Intermedia and Digex, all parties who were interested in going
forward with discussions were required to sign a confidentiality and
nondisclosure agreement, 96 surely an unnecessary condition if the
relevant information was already public. This information, however,
could come from only two sources: from the controlling shareholder
who would have received such knowledge through its board represen-
tation or in its position as a controlling shareholder or directly from
the controlled corporation itself.
The controlling shareholder's use of non-public information poses
a Digex concern whatever the source of the information. The ALI's
Principles of Corporate Governance frame the issue nicely. Section 5.11
on its face prohibits a controlling shareholder from using material,
non-public information to secure a pecuniary benefit from trading in
the controlled corporation's securities.97 Alternatively, if the informa-
tion is intended to come from hands-on investigation by the acquirer,
access to information, records, and personnel is possible only with the
approval of the controlled corporation. Approval of that access can
be seen as posing the same opportunity for bargaining as approval of
the section 203 waiver in Digex.
While one can imagine a range of accommodations by the con-
trolled corporation-like facilitating due diligence-that are transac-
tionally necessary or helpful to the sale of control, the problem is
posed most starkly by another, more effective, spillover from the world
of hostile takeovers. Section 203 is not, and was not intended to be,
a showstopper. Unless the acquirer needs access to the controlled
corporation's assets (for example, to provide security for the financing
96 Id. at 1182.
97PRINCIPLES OF CoRP. GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.11
(1994).
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needed in the takeover), the inability to do a freeze-out merger for a
three-year period is not an insurmountable barrier. s In the hostile
takeover environment, the roles of section 203 and other antitakeover
statutes were largely marginalized by the poison pill, which stops a
hostile transaction much earlier in the process than the second-step
transaction."
In the context of a sale of control, the poison pill can provide
dramatically more than the "some degree of bargaining leverage" 00
that the chancery court found section 203 provided the Digex board.
If the fiduciary obligation of the controlled corporation's board dic-
tates that it take advantage of every bargaining lever for the benefit of
the minority shareholders, then the board may also have the obliga-
tion to create a lever. The board can simply adopt a poison pill that
covers all but the existing controlling shareholder, effectively reserv-
ing to the board a veto power (or whatever power the pill currently
accords the board under Delaware law)"" over the controlling share-
holder's sale of control. Now that is leverage.
Analyzing the role of the controlled corporation's board is
straightforward. If the directors have a fiduciary obligation to bargain,
then a failure even to consider adoption of a poison pill would surely
violate their duty of care. Once the board takes up the question, the
directors associated with the controlling shareholder are hopelessly
conflicted. Either they must appoint a special committee with the
right to adopt and manage a pill, in which event at least the burden of
proof would shift, or the decision not to adopt the pill would, under
Digex, be subject to entire fairness review with the burden of proof
on the directors. If failing to use the section 203 lever was likely to
fail this standard, despite the acknowledged advantages to Digex of a
98 For example, section 203 does not prohibit post-acquisition transactions with a
third party, leaving the potential for a bust-up takeover in place.
99 See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 1, at 1399 (asserting that "[s] tate takeover stat-
utes should have no influence on companies that already have firm level defenses
like .0 . poison pills").
Digex, 789 A.2d at 1205.
101 See Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 27
DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 37 (2002) [hereinafter Gilson, A Short Reply]; Ronald J. Gilson,
Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 501
(2001) [hereinafter Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later]; Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe,
Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002),
which debate what power the pill gives a board under Delaware law.
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WorldCom acquisition of Intermedia, then so, too, would failing to
adopt and exert the leverage of a pill.
1 02
It should be apparent that this rather straightforward analysis
of the controlled corporation's post-Digex obligation to adopt a pill
would effectively overturn the principle that controlling shareholders
can sell control at a premium. In our analysis of the symmetry among
the three doctrines that comprise the restraints on controlling share-
holders, we argued that the permissive sale of control standard was
103appropriate. Certainly nothing in Digex speaks to that issue, and our
analysis counsels that the chancery court's Digex approach leads in the
wrong direction. So what can be done about it?
While the Digex problem is surely catalyzed by the effectiveness of
the poison pill, we do not think that the easy response of imposing
context-specific restraints on the use of the pill is the right ap-
104proach. The poison pill makes the conflict between Digex and a
permissive sale of control standard more pointed, but as illustrated by
our analysis of Digex's application to transactional due diligence,1 0
that conflict is hardly limited to the pill.
In our view, the right way to disarm this conflict is to situate it in
the symmetry of restraints on controlling shareholders. In Part I, we
argued that, because the Sinclair standard should keep the price of fo-
cused monitoring within a range that non-controlling shareholders
102 While Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985),
speaks of the board's responsibility to defend against a hostile bid, we are not aware of
a case that considers what standard of review would apply to a decision not to defend.
Perhaps a decision not to defend converts the hostile bid to a friendly bid, in which
event the standard of review-the intermediate standard or the more rigorous version
of the business judgment rule that the chancery court has developed in connection
with non-Revlon takeovers, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1985)--depends on the Revlon trigger. In the sale of control setting, in
contrast, the control relationship would seem to dictate entire fairness in all events.
103 See discussion supra Part I.B (arguing that the permissive standard allows for
both adequate control and value maximization).
104 As we will see with the Siliconix line of cases, infra Part 11.B, the specter of hav-
ing to apply the poison pill in contexts other than defenses against hostile bids is not
limited to the sale of control context. When the conformity of the poison pill with the
structure of Delaware law was first debated in connection with Household Internationa
the critics argued that it dramatically changed the allocation of authority between
shareholders and management. The courts rejected that position. See Household Int4
500 A.2d at 1354 (finding that the case did not effect a "'fundamental transfer of
power from the stockholders to the directors"' (quoting appellants)). The same struc-
tural concern is raised, however, by the role of the pill in the sale of control and freeze-
out settings explored here.
105 See supra p. 810 (utilizing due diligence to illustrate that information may also
act as a bargaining lever).
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would be willing to pay, a permissive sale of control standard is appro-
priate. ' °6 Encouraging control sales benefits non-controlling share-
holders because, subject to the monitoring payment allowed by Sin-
clair, they participate ratably in any post-transaction value increases. '°7
This assessment suggests that the Sinclair standard should be the
touchstone of a principled resolution of the conflict between Digex
and the sale of control standard.
Sinclair poses the triggering test"' for heightened review as whether
"the parent has received a benefit to the exclusion and at the expense
of the subsidiary."'1' 9 We think this is also the appropriate triggering
test for the standard governing controlled subsidiary participation in a
sale of control transaction. The distinction is between a setting where
the non-controlling shareholders have something directly at stake in
the transaction-that is, where non-controlling shareholders lose
something as a result of the transaction-and one where the issue is
only an effort to extract a payment by holding up the transaction.
Thus, controlled corporation participation in activities like ac-
quirer due diligence does not come at the expense of the subsidiary;
withholding participation serves only as a hold-up device for which the
symmetry of doctrine provides no support. The same analysis would
apply to the controlled subsidiary's decision to adopt a poison pill di-
rected at the sale of control." °
106 See supra pp. 794-96 (advocating for a permissive sale of control in light of the
Sinclair boundaries to which it would remain subject).
107 See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing data that suggest minority
shareholders benefit from sales of control through higher share prices).
108 Einer Elhauge originated this useful characterization of a legal rule whose ap-
plication determines which of other competing legal rules apply. Einer Elhauge, The
T"ig *e9Vng Function of Sale of Control, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1501-03 (1992).
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
110 From a different perspective, an effort by the controlled subsidiary's board
simply to assert hold-up value would seem to run afoul of the principle in Mendel v.
Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994), which does not permit a board "to deploy
corporate power against the majority stockholders, in the absence of a threatened seri-
ous breach of fiduciary duty by the controlling stock." In Mendel the board sought to
dilute the controlling shareholders' position to allow an acquisition of the corporation
at a price that was favorable to the minority shareholders but not to the controlling
shareholders; in our circumstance, the board would be trying to block a transaction
favorable to the controlling shareholder but not to the minority shareholder. See, e.g.,
EAC Indus. v. Frantz Mfg. Co., No. 8003, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 464, at *29-30 (Del. Ch.
June 28, 1985) (enjoining the board's effort to dilute a controlling shareholder to al-
low an acquisition of the corporation to go forward).
At least one author of this Article is dismayed that the Principles of Corporate
Governance are ambiguous on the conflict between section 5.11 (Use by a Controlling
Shareholder of Corporate Property, Material Non-Public Corporate Information, or
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Consistent with the permissive sale of control doctrine, some limi-
tations apply. The controlling shareholder cannot sell control when it
has reason to believe that the acquirer will extract private benefits in
excess of the Sinclair standard and cannot deal with the non-control-
ling shareholders without first disclosing an anticipated sale of con-
trol. 1 ' Under the same circumstances, the board of the controlled
corporation should have a Digex-like obligation to act; in these situa-
tions, the controlling shareholder does gain at the expense of the
non-controlling shareholders. The symmetry between the exceptions
is not coincidental.'
1 2
That leaves for assessment the precise issue posed in Digex: the
application and waiver of section 203 in a situation that the legislature
did not contemplate. Here, we think, the short answer is that we are
stuck with what the legislature has done. Once the legislature has
Corporate Position) and section 5.16 (Disposition of Voting Equity Securities by a
Controlling Shareholder to Third Parties). PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.11, .16 (1994). While parsing the black letter
of both sections would fairly give one pause, at least the commentary to section 5.11 is
consistent with the primacy of sale of control principles over the more general princi-
ples governing actions by controlling shareholders:
Certain acquisitions and dispositions of a corporation's securities involve the
exercise or relinquishment of control, which is governed by § 5.16... rather
than § 5.11. Accordingly, § 5.11 (a) [barring controlling shareholder use of
non-public information or corporate power] does not preclude a controlling
shareholder from selling shares of the corporation at a premium.., if the
standards of § 5.16 are met and no other conduct is present that would consti-
tute a breach of the duty of fair dealing.
Id. § 5.11 cmt. c(1).
See supra note 29 (quoting the ALI's limitations on sale of control).
112 The doctrinal symmetry is completed by understanding that dilution would be
allowed under the Mendel exception for "a threatened serious breach of fiduciary
duty," 651 A.2d at 306, when the board believed the controlling shareholder was going
to increase the level of private benefit extraction, the parallel to the similar exception
to the permissive sale of control standard. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29
(explaining that the controlling shareholder cannot sell at a premium when it is ap-
parent that the buyer will increase the level of private benefit extraction).
This is consistent with a recent unreported decision in which Chancellor William
B. Chandler III refused to enjoin a poison pill put in place by a special committee that
blocked the forty-four percent holder's plan to acquire sufficient additional stock for
an absolute majority and that would have permitted the holder to block a higher third-
party bid in favor of its own bid. Creo Inc. v Printcafe Software, Inc., No. 20164, at 11
(Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2003) (ruling denying request for temporary restraining order); see
also Memorandum of Law of Plaintiff Creo Inc. in Support of Its Motion for a Tem-
porary Restraining Order, Creo Inc. v Printcafe Software, Inc., No. 20164 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 21, 2003), 2003 WL 21665298 (presenting the plaintiffs account of the facts);
David Marcus, Cleaning Up Your Corporate Structure, CORP. CONTROL ALERT, July 2003, at
20, 21 (describing the unreported bench ruling in Creo).
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given the controlled corporation a bargaining lever, a Sinclair analysis
dictates that it be used." 3 In our view, the application of section 203
to a sale of control by an existing controlling shareholder is an un-
necessary spillover of the takeover defense apparatus into non-
takeover contexts. Fixing the boundaries of section 203, however, is
properly a chore for the legislature. 4 In the meantime, the limited
range of post-acquisition transactions to which section 203 applies at
least cabins the problem. 5
113 See supra text accompanying notes 100-01 (discussing a corporate board's legal
obligation to use and perhaps even create bargaining levers).
14 We have some sympathy for the argument that the section 203 waiver in Digex
was entirely fair to the public minority. The minority had no right to participate in the
control premium, no right to impede the sale or to force a transactional alternative,
and in exchange for the section 203 waiver, received a protective governance change
and a parent with deeper pockets. Nonetheless, it is one thing to say that the minority
received something substantial for their cooperation; it is quite another to conclude
that they received what they would have in an arm's-length bargain.
15 In light of the traditional concerns in a case like Digex about a controller's cap-
turing a control premium that a merger would have shared with the minority, two re-
cent Delaware Supreme Court cases strike us as odd. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910,
916-17 (Del. 2000), presents the irony of potentially imposing a higher standard when
the controlling shareholder allows the minority to participate ratably in a control sale
than when the minority is excluded from such a sale. In McMullin, a controlling
shareholder negotiated the sale of the entire corporation with all shareholders receiv-
ing the same price. Id. While recognizing that the board of the controlled subsidiary
lacked the power to block or even influence the transaction, the court nonetheless
held that the controlled subsidiary board had violated its fiduciary duty by failing to
fully inform itself about whether the transaction price exceeded the subsidiary's going
concern value. Id. at 919-20. Consequently, the subsidiary board could not discharge
its disclosure obligation to minority shareholders who had to decide whether or not to
seek appraisal. Id. at 920. While there is a real puzzle concerning why the directors
could not reasonably rely on the judgment of the controlling shareholder given that
the controlling shareholder had the same incentive to maximize price, the case is best
understood as imposing a disclosure obligation which complicates, but does not re-
strict, a controlling shareholder's power to sell its control in the course of merger.
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003), limits the abil-
ity of a shareholder with majority voting power to irrevocably commit herself to sup-
port a merger as part of a transaction in which the board of the controlled corporation
has consented to a "force the vote" provision in the merger agreement. In Omnicare
the controlled corporation, NCS, sought to escape insolvency through a proposed
merger with Genesis Health Ventures, Inc. Id. at 921. Genesis was unwilling to play a
"stalking horse" role and sought to lock up the transaction. Id. at 920. The two domi-
nant shareholders (who maintained sixty-six percent of the voting power but only
twenty percent of the equity, id. at 935) displayed their commitment to the transaction
by entering into a voting agreement with Genesis that committed them to vote for the
merger. Id. at 926. At the time, the dominant shareholders knew that the NCS board
had approved a compulsory shareholder vote on the merger and left no fiduciary "out"
in the merger agreement. Id. at 924-25. All shareholders were to receive identical per
share consideration. Id. at 925. A divided Delaware Supreme Court held that the
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resulting lockup was both preclusive and coercive with respect to the shareholder right
to consider transactional alternatives, notwithstanding the express desire of the con-
trolling stockholders to bargain away that right in protecting the existing transaction.
Id. at 939.
From a doctrinal perspective, the case illustrates the inconsistencies in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del. 1989), which applies
proportionality to defensive measures in the context of a friendly merger, yet permits a
particular defense-Time's tender offer for Warner-that, as a factual matter, was pre-
clusive. The court dodged this problem with the assertion that, at least in principle,
Paramount could bid for the merged company. Time, 571 A.2d at 1155. But if this
theoretical possibility solves the preclusiveness problem in Time, why wouldn't it work
equally well in Omnicare?
One way to understand Omnicare and Digex is as an inchoate effort to deal with the
troubling mismatch between control rights and cash flow rights that emerges from
dual class capital structures. In Digex, Chancellor Chandler was obviously troubled by
the gap between Intermedia's ninety-four percent voting power and its fifty-two per-
cent equity interest. 789 A.2d at 1181, 1203. According to the chancellor, such a dis-
parity between ownership and voting power contradicted the legislative policy concern
that tender offers should be curbed when they are not "sufficiently attractive to... a
high percentage of the outstanding shares." Id. at 1203. Similarly, in Omnicare, the
court noted with distaste that a decision by shareholders holding only twenty percent
of the company's equity but sixty-five percent of the voting rights could bind the re-
maining public eighty percent to a decision that the latter contingent now could not
oppose. See 818 A.2d at 936 ("[A]ny stockholder vote would have been robbed of its
effectiveness by the impermissible coercion that predetermined the outcome of the
merger without regard to the merits ...."). From this perspective, because the con-
trolling shareholders in Omnicare could not have sold control other than through a
corporate-level transaction like a merger (their voting control disappeared if they sold
their shares), the NCS independent directors, like those in Digex, were conflicted
about whether they should block the controlling shareholders' efforts to impose a con-
trol transaction. As suggested in Mende 651 A.2d at 306, a "true" majority shareholder
might legitimately have received greater deference from the board.
Moreover, the mismatch between voting rights and cash flow rights is particularly
problematic because the insolvency risk of the controlled corporation means that the
payoffs from the two transactional alternatives could well have been evaluated quite
differently by the public shareholders (who are diversified and therefore risk neutral)
and the controllers (who are undiversified and therefore risk averse). Cf Credit Lyon-
nais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991), aff'd sub nom. Solomon v. Pathe Commu-
nications Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996) (discussing the different incentives for credi-
tors and shareholders in a company "operating in the vicinity of insolvency"). Of
course, nothing in the Omnicare opinion directly turns on this distinction, although the
facts clearly suggest it.
The current version of the European Union's proposed Thirteenth Directive on
Takeovers reflects this uneasiness about voting rights that are disproportionate to eq-
uity, although the proposal would not extend to eliminating the kind of dispropor-
tionate voting rights present in Omnicare. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Cross-Border Mergers of Companies with
Share Capital, COM(03)703 final; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The International Relations
Wedge in the Corporate Convergence Debate, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & MarkJ. Roe eds., forthcoming 2004) (dis-
cussing the Thirteenth Directive).
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B. The Siliconix Line of Cases: Relaxing the Standards
Governing Freeze-outs
In Part I, we justified the more restrictive standard governing judi-
cial review of the fairness of a controlling shareholder's freeze-out
of non-controlling shareholders because, unlike in a sale of control
situation, non-controlling shareholders will not participate automati-
cally in an increase in value that results from the freeze-out.
A number of recent chancery court opinions have loosened these
standards, in our view inappropriately. The doctrinal symmetry gov-
erning limits on the extraction of private benefits by controlling
shareholders suggests that the recent chancery court tightening of the
standards for sale of control is ill-advised. In the case of the standards
governing freeze-outs, the same symmetry suggests that the recent
loosening of the standards is also misguided.
The loosening of the freeze-out standards came in response to a
shift in transaction engineering. The tightness of the standard of re-
view governing freeze-out mergers crystallized in Kahn I. The supreme
court stated, in no uncertain terms, that even the creation of a special
committee with the power to block the transaction would not elimi-
nate entire fairness review. 1 6 Rather, the court held that establishing
such a committee merely shifted the burden of proof.1"7 In response,
transaction planners began to look at a tender offer as the first step in
a two-step freeze-out process.
The strategy builds on the supreme court's decision in Solomon v.
Pathe Communications Corp.," 8 which held that a shareholder with vot-
ing control over 89.5% of a corporation's outstanding stock owed no
obligation with respect to the fairness of the price offered in a tender
offer for the stock of the controlled corporation, unless the offer was
structurally coercive or disclosure concerning the offer was inade-
quate." 9 Suppose a controlling shareholder held eighty percent of the
controlled corporation's outstanding stock and desired to freeze out
the minority shareholders. If it proceeded in a straightforward man-
ner with a one-step freeze-out merger, the transaction would be sub-
ject to entire fairness review under Weinberger, which, in effect, calls
116 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994);
supra text accompanying notes 50-58.
117 Kahn , 638 A.2d at 1117.
118 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
119 See id. at 40 ("[I]n the absence of coercion or disclosure violations, the ade-
quacy of the price in a voluntary tender offer cannot be an issue.").
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for a class action appraisal process with respect to price.120 An alterna-
tive approach would be to accomplish the freeze-out in two steps.
First, the controlling shareholder would make a tender offer for all
of the non-controlling stock with a majority-of-the-minority closing
condition 12 and, perhaps, a commitment to take out any non-
tendering shareholders in a short-form merger at the same price in
order to insure that the offer is not coercive. Solomon is commonly
read to dictate that this offer would be free from entire fairness re-
view.
122
Next, the controlling shareholder would effect a short-form merger
under section 253, which requires neither a shareholder vote nor the
approval of the controlled corporation. 123 Under Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corp.,124 appraisal is the exclusive remedy for allegations of
price unfairness in a short-form merger. 12 The two-step freeze-out thus
accomplishes something critical that a one-step freeze-out merger
cannot: the elimination of entire fairness review of any step in the
120 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983); see also supra text
accompanying notes 31-41 (describing the Weinberger case and the standards adopted
therein).
121 In this hypothetical, satisfying a majority of the minority condition would as-
sure that the controlling shareholder would reach the ninety percent level necessary to
a short-form merger. If the controlling shareholder's pre-transaction holdings were
less than eighty percent, an additional closing condition would be required; sufficient
shares would have to be tendered so that the controlling shareholder would own
ninety percent of the outstanding shares after the transaction closed.
12 In fact, this reading of Solomon is itself an unacknowledged stretch. Solomon did
not involve a tender offer that was part of a freeze-out transaction and, thus, could
have been read as inapplicable in a freeze-out setting. Indeed, both the Delaware Su-
preme Court opinion, Solomon, 672 A.2d at 39, and the lower court opinion, No.
12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995), emphasize that the transaction
was not a freeze-out. As the text that follows relates, Solomon was read broadly without
acknowledgement or justification of the extension.
Moreover, the Solomon transaction was itself so unusual that it would be unwar-
ranted to read the case broadly. The controller's tender offer was part of a series of
transactions by which a secured lender took majority control in the process of realizing
on its security interest in the stock of the parent's operating subsidiary. Solomon, 672
A.2d at 37. The Chancellor found that there was no valid basis to resist the foreclo-
sure. Solomon, 1995 WL 250374, at *5-6. The tender offer to public minority share-
holders-whose stock would be valueless after foreclosure of the subsidiary's stock-
was, in effect, a means to buy off any potential hold-up value that the minority might
conceivably have possessed. The Chancellor described the lawsuit as an "effort to
leverage some additional money from the secured-creditor/new majority shareholder
out of this 1992 mop-up operation." Id. at *6.
123 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
124 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
125 Id. at 243.
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transaction, including especially the fairness of the price. The new
transaction form makes appraisal exclusive for the entire transaction;
the class appraisal proceeding provided by entire fairness review dis-
appears. Of course, the change in standard suggests a change in bid-
der tactics. Short of a belief that non-controlling shareholders will
not tender, a controlling shareholder should never offer more than
the low end of her assessment of the appraisal standard. Even if her
assessment proves to be less than fair value, any higher price resulting
from an appraisal proceeding will be payable only to the small num-
ber of shareholders who both do not tender and otherwise perfect
their appraisal rights.
The first clear test of this strategy came in Siliconix. 1 6 In that case,
Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. sought to acquire the roughly twenty per-
127cent of Siliconix stock that it did not own. After proposing a cash
tender offer, perhaps to be followed by a freeze-out merger at the
tender offer price, and establishing a special committee of allegedly
disinterested Siliconix directors, Vishay ultimately lost patience when
the special committee proved more independent than Vishay ex-
pected.128 Vishay then substituted a stock-for-stock exchange with a
majority of the minority condition and plainly stopped worrying about
the special committee's views.'2 The special committee advised Vishay
that it was unlikely to approve the terms of the exchange offer, but in
its Schedule 14D-9, the special committee made no recommendation
concerning the offer and did not ask its financial advisor for a fairness
opinion. 30 The exchange offer was the issue before the court on a
131motion for preliminary injunction.
The court quickly concluded that, following Solomon, a controlling
shareholder had no obligation to demonstrate the entire fairness of a
proposed tender offer without pausing over the fact that, unlike Solo-
mon, the Siliconix transaction contemplated a freeze-out.132 The court
also held that the Siliconix directors did not breach a duty of care
or loyalty to minority shareholders by failing to evaluate Vishay's offer
126 In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 (Del. Ch. June
19, 2001).
127 Id. at *1.
128 Id. at *2-3.
129 Id. at *3-4.
130 Id. at *5.
131 Id. at *1, *6.
132 Id. at *8. See supra note 122 for a discussion of Solomon.
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nor by failing to provide shareholders with their evaluation and rec-
ommendation.
3 3
It was with respect to the court's treatment of Siliconix's directors
that the analysis gets interesting. The court recognized that
[i]t may seem strange that the scrutiny given to tender offer transactions is less
than the scrutiny that may be given to, for example, a merger transaction ....
From the standpoint of a Siliconix shareholder, there may be little substantive
difference if the tender is successful and Vishay proceeds, as it has indicated
that it most likely will, with the short-form merger. The Siliconix sharehold-
ers... will end up in the same position as if he or she had tendered or if the
transaction had been structured as a merger 
....134
The reason for this discrepancy will have a familiar ring. The
court focused on the different role corporate law assigns the board in
mergers as opposed to tender offers:
[U]nder the corporation law, a board of directors which is given the critical
role of initiating and recommending a merger to the shareholders tradition-
ally has been accorded no statutory role whatsoever with respect to a public
tender offer .... This distinctive treatment of board power with respect to
merger and tender offers is not satisfactorily explained by the observation that
the corporation law statutes were basically designed in a period when large
scale public tender offers were rarities .... More likely, one would suppose, is
that conceptual notion that tender offers essentially represent the sale of
shareholders' separate property and such sales--even when aggregated into a
single change in control transaction-require no "corporate" action ..... 
M
This account of the board's role in mergers and tender offers is
plainly recognizable as the premise of those who argued in the early
1980s that defensive tactics by managers were inappropriate. 3 6 Now
the court says that a conflicted target board violates no duty of loyalty
by failing to act on behalf of minority shareholders in a freeze-out
tender offer because the statute assigns them no explicit role. 37 In
the 1980s, shareholder choice advocates argued that target manage-
ment could not act-ostensibly on behalf of shareholders-to block a
tender offer because the statute assigned them no explicit role.
133 Id. at *6-8.
134 Id. at *7.
135 Id. (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 847 (1981) ("While control of
the merger and sale of asset mechanisms is firmly ensconced in management, the ten-
der offer mechanism generally is not even mentioned in the statute, let alone placed
within management's control.").
137 Siliconix, 2001 WL 716787, at *7-8.
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Of course, the shareholder choice advocates lost that battle. In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 1 38 the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a target board of directors "had both the power and duty to op-
pose a bid it perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise.'
As the court put it, even in a tender offer "a board of directors is not a
passive instrumentality.' 4 The Delaware Supreme Court then went
one step further in Moran v. Household International, Inc.'41 Making
sure that the target board of directors had the means to act effectively
in opposing a tender offer that the board perceived as a threat, the
court approved the adoption of a poison pill that made it unthinkable
for a bidder to go forward with a tender offer unless the board ap-
proved the offer or a court ordered the pill redeemed.1
42
Thus, there is a sharp disconnect between Siliconix's characteriza-
tion of the target board's role in responding to a freeze-out tender of-
fer by a controlling shareholder and the Delaware Supreme Court's
characterization of the target board's role in responding to a third-
party tender offer. Rather perversely, only when the board is con-
flicted by the offer itself is it limited to an observer's role.
Indeed, if the extent of the board's role is to turn on whether the
bidder is a controlling shareholder, the court in Siliconix seems to get
the direction of the distinction exactly backwards. In a third-party
tender offer, the potential for competitive bidding if the initial offer is
too low will provide target shareholders some protection even if the
board does not. In a controlling-shareholder tender offer, only the
target board can act. The question that Siliconix should have con-
fronted is what standard of review applies when the board of the con-
trolled corporation either did not consider, or did not adopt, a poison
pill that would have given it real bargaining power. Because the ma-
jority of the board was conflicted, the court would be required to de-
termine whether it was entirely fair not to adopt a pill, a determina-
tion that, because the fair-dealing element necessarily drops out, turns
on whether the court thinks either the price or the board's strategy is
entirely fair. 1 3 This, of course, is precisely the determination a court
138 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
139 Id. at 949 (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 954.
141 500 A.2d 1346, 1355 (Del. 1985).
142 Id. at 1349, 1355.
143 Experienced acquisitions practitioner Ted Mirvis suggested in conversation that
the use of the pill in response to a hostile tender offer is quite different from its use in
a freeze-out transaction precisely because a pill is designed to prevent a transfer in con-
trol, while with a freeze-out, control has transferred long before. While we cannot
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has to make under Weinberger, which Siliconix says does not apply to
freeze-out tender offers, a nice closing of a doctrinal M6bius strip.
1
4
In the end, what is most striking in Siliconix's treatment of the target
board's role is that the court at no point even evidences awareness
of twenty years of doctrinal encouragement of a target board's non-
statutory role in responding to tender offers.
The chancery court next took up the target board's role in a
freeze-out tender offer in In re Aquila, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.145 For
doctrinal purposes, Aquila is largely a replay of Siliconix. The court
again held that a controlling shareholder does not have a duty of en-
tire fairness when making a freeze-out tender offer.1 46 But Aquila does
go somewhat further in approving a passive role for the target board.
The conflicted directors (no independent directors existed) were al-
lowed to discharge their duty of loyalty to the non-controlling share-
holders by doing essentially nothing. 147 The board's effort on behalf
of the non-controlling shareholders consisted solely of asking an in-
dependent financial advisor "to perform a financial analysis of the
proposed exchange ratio and to publish a summary of that analysis in
the company's Schedule 14D-9," 4 8 presumably as a substitute for the
board's decision not to make a recommendation themselves.
Strangely, the plaintiffs did "not argue that these three directors
[named by the controlling shareholder] had a fiduciary duty to do
more," and the court plainly shared this assessment. 49 Yet, the board's
passivity left shareholders with neither a bargaining agent nor an in-
formation agent, conduct hardly consistent with the high standard set
for conflicted directors in Weinberger.15 Even where the controlling
quarrel with this distinction, in our view the commonality that links the two settings is
the board's obligation when it believes that shareholders may tender into an under-
priced offer. From this perspective, differential control is a distinction without a dif-
ference; why should the board's duty to protect shareholders be lower when the threat
is the misuse of control than when the threat is an unfavorable transfer of control?
144 See supra text accompanying notes 34-40 for the Weinberger requirement in a
freeze-out merger; supra text accompanying note 132 for the Siliconix rejection of that
requirement in a freeze-out tender offer.
145 805 A.2d 184, 190 (Del. Ch. 2002).
146 Id.
147 See id. at 191 (holding that the target board's failure to make a recommenda-




150 Weinberger stressed "the long-existing principle of Delaware law that [the con-
trolling shareholder] designated directors on [the controlled corporation's] board still
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shareholder offers a price within a range of reasonableness, share-
holders still have a big stake in getting the high end, rather than the
low end, of the range. From this perspective, recall Weinberger's stress
on the fact that Signal believed the non-controlling shares of UOP
were a "good investment" at a price up to $24 a share, but offered only
$21.151 The failure of UOP's board to bargain for a price at the higher
end of the range plainly drove the result. Even if the controlling
shareholder has no obligation of entire fairness in a freeze-out tender
offer, Aquila offers no explanation for how Van Gorkom-like passivity
(whether motivated by inattention or conflict) can satisfy the target
board's fiduciary duty.
152
As with Siliconix, however, the most interesting part of Aquila is
the extent to which its discussion of the target board's role in freeze-
out tender offers ignores the obvious overlaps between the doctrinal
framework governing the target board's role in freeze-out tender of-
fers and that governing the target board's role in hostile tender of-
fers.153 The target corporation in Aquila had a remarkably high per-
centage of institutional investors; ninety-four institutions held more
than eighty percent of all publicly held shares, and twenty-two institu-
tions accounted for a majority of such shares. This distribution be-
came relevant in connection with the court's assessment of irreparable
harm and the balance of the equities in responding to the motion for
preliminary injunction. 55 The alleged harm to the shareholders from
the board's passivity was what has come to be called "substantive coer-
cion" in hostile takeover doctrine-the concern that shareholders will
mistakenly accept too low a price for their shares. 56 In the context of
hostile tender offer doctrine, substantive coercion is offered as ajusti-
fication for defensive action even against a structurally noncoercive
owed [the controlled corporation] and its shareholders an uncompromising duty of
loyaly." 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
Id. at 705.
152 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (holding that the pas-
sivity of the directors failed to satisfy the duty of care).
153 805 A.2d at 190-95.
154 Id. at 187.
155 See id. at 195 (finding that, in light of the extensive disclosure documents given
to the stockholders, the absence of a recommendation from the target board "is not
such an important omission as to justify an injunction [when] ... the publicly owned
shares are nearly all owned by sophisticated institutional investors").
156 The Delaware Supreme Court first adopted this term in Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 n.17 (Del. 1989), from RonaldJ. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance
to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 267 (1989).
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tender offer. Interestingly, when used tojustify defensive tactics, sub-
stantive coercion appears to be a presumption, rather than a fact.
Once alleged, factual inquiry into the sophistication of the target
shareholders is unnecessary.157
In Aquila, by contrast, the court relies explicitly on the sophistica-
tion of institutional shareholders in concluding that the plaintiffs had
failed to show irreparable harm-i.e., that there was not a significant
risk of substantive coercion. 158 In particular, the absence of a 14D-9
statement was unlikely to increase the risk of shareholders mistakenly
tendering "when, as here, the publicly owned shares are nearly all
owned by sophisticated institutional investors." 9 As in Siliconix, the
same element was treated differently in connection with a freeze-out
tender offer than in connection with a hostile tender offer.
Our analysis to this point suggests that the chancery court has
moved in the wrong direction in its recent treatments of the restric-
tions on controlling shareholders who extract private benefits of con-
trol through freeze-outs. The symmetry dictated by the functional
links between the three methods of extracting private benefits draws
no distinction based on the mechanical technique used to effect a
freeze-out. Siliconix and Aquila, when coupled with Glassman, signifi-
candy reduce the constraints on benefit extraction through freeze-
outs from the level we have argued is appropriate. Adding insult to
injury, Siliconix and Aquila justify their results based entirely on doc-
trine, rather than function, yet as we have suggested, they do not con-
front the doctrinal inconsistencies and transactional incentives they in
turn create.
157 This presumed lack of sophistication was plainly the case in Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1382 (Del. 1995), where the court credited the
target's characterization of a hostile offer as a threat because shareholders might ten-
der based on a mistaken view of the target's intrinsic value without pausing over
the facts that institutional investors held forty-two percent of Unitrin's stock and that
thirty-three percent of Unitrin's stock was held by only twenty institutions. In contrast,
the chancery court has on occasion treated the threat of substantive coercion as a fact
that has to be proved, rather than merely alleged. See, e.g., Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,
771 A.2d 293, 333 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("The defendants have not persuaded me that they
made an informed, good faith judgment that the [target] electorate would be con-
fused about [the target's] value ... .
158 805 A.2d at 186.
159 Id. at 195.
160 The formal thinness of the distinction between the transactional forms is dem-
onstrated by Hartley v. Peapod, Inc., No. 19025, 2002 WL 31957458, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar.
27, 2002), in which the court held that a merger structured as a two-step transaction-
a tender offer followed by short-form freeze-out-is subject to the Kahn entire fairness
regime. As a formal matter, the case follows In re Unocal Exploration Corp. Shareholders
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The judicial disconnect between the conflicting lines of doctrine
governing a controlling shareholder's obligations in freeze-out merg-
ers and freeze-out tender offers and the similarly conflicting lines of
doctrine governing the target board's role in freeze-out tender offers
and in hostile tender offers was finally addressed in In re Pure Resources,
Inc. Shareholders Litigation."" Pure presented another opportunity for
the chancery court to consider the standards governing the tender of-
fer, freeze-out alternative to a freeze-out merger. In Pure, however,
two things were significantly different than in Siliconix and Aquila:
plaintiffs who recognized the disconnect between the target board's
role in freeze-out and hostile tender offers and a judge who was un-
willing to ignore it. The plaintiffs' position explicitly claimed that the
target board should have acted like a real board and adopted a poison
pill to give itself some bargaining room. To be sure, the plaintiffs do
not deserve all the credit; they were helped in making this claim by
the brief but unusual spurt of independence by the target board's
special committee. For a short time-but, as far as we know, for the
first time-this special committee asked for the authority to adopt a
poison pill.1 63 Once properly framed, and given the conspicuous op-
portunity to make some sense of an area where the combination of
blatant doctrinal inconsistencies and the predictable planning re-
sponse of transactions taking the form that results in the least con-
straints without affecting substance, a thoughtful judge would have
found it difficult to turn a blind eye.
Thus, in Pure, the chancery court directly confronted the two doc-
trinal anomalies posed by the freeze-out, tender offer strategy: first,
the tensions among Solomon, Kahn I, and Kahn II over the standards
that apply to a controlling shareholder's freeze-out of non-controlling
Litigation, 793 A.2d 329, 338 n.26, 347 (Del. Ch. 2000), affd, Glassman v. UnocalExplora-
tion Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001), which, in holding that appraisal was ordinarily the
exclusive remedy for a short-form merger, distinguished the case of a two-step transac-
tion. But notice the result: shareholders get more protection from subsequent judi-
cial review in a transaction in which they may have the benefits of a bargaining agent
than in one lacking such a bargaining agent.
161 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).
162 See id. at 433 (describing plaintiffs' argument that "[i]nstead of wielding the
power to stop Unocal in its tracks and make it really negotiate, the Pure board has
taken only the insufficient course of telling the Pure minority to say no").
163 Unfortunately, the special committee backed down without explanation and, to
the court's annoyance, declined to waive the attorney-client privilege, which would
have allowed inquiry into what legal advice the committee was given on this issue. See
id. at 431 n.8 ("[I]n general it seems unwise for a special committee to hide behind the
privilege .... ).
826 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
shareholders and, second, the conflict in the standards that apply to a
target board's response to a freeze-out tender offer and to its response
to a hostile tender offer. Properly understood, the Pure resolution is
an important, yet still incomplete, step toward restoring a desirable
coherence in this area. Our goal here is twofold: first, to highlight
where that step leads, both in terms of the convergence of standards
that govern the freeze-out tender offer and the freeze-out merger and
in terms of the potential convergence of the target board's duties in
a freeze-out tender offer and a hostile tender offer, and second, to
identify what else is necessary to restore symmetry to the doctrine that
controls controlling shareholders.
The convergence of the standards for freeze-out mergers and
freeze-out tender offers is possible because the doctrinal breadth of
the "get out of jail free" card-that Solomon is said to give freeze-out
tender offers-has been, as Pure clearly recognized, significantly over-
stated. Despite its subsequent treatment in the case law, Solomon sim-
ply is not doctrinally determinative. Its limits become clear once we
recognize that a freeze-out tender offer implicates the entire fairness
standard in two different ways.' 64 First, and the focus of the court's at-
tention in Solomon, is the fiduciary duty of the controlling shareholder:
is the controlling shareholder under an obligation of entire fairness in
setting the terms of the tender offer? Second is the fiduciary duty of
the target directors: are the target directors subject to a fiduciary duty
to the non-controlling shareholders despite the existence of a control-
ling shareholder?
The only question addressed by Solomon's statement that "courts
do not impose any right of the shareholders to receive a particular
price" 65 is that of the controlling shareholder's fiduciary duty. While
the complaint in Solomon also alleged that the target company direc-
tors violated their duty of loyalty because they did not oppose the con-
trolling shareholder's tender offer, the court disposed of that issue
without challenging the applicability of the standard.' 66 Thus, Solomon
164 We have noted earlier that Solomon itself did not involve a freeze-out tender
offer, supra note 122. Thus, the doctrinal development of a distinction between freeze-
out mergers and freeze-out tender offers is flawed at a stage earlier than we address in
the text here.
165 Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39 (Del. 1996).
16r In dismissing the claim against the target directors, the court held:
[The complaint] attempts to assert a breach of the duty of fair dealing by the
directors because they did not oppose the tender offer. The asserted unfairness
of the tender offer is based on its allegedly inadequate price. The Chancel-
lor's holding that none of the facts cited by Solomon "can be said to arouse as
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plainly leaves open the potential for convergence between the stan-
dards governing freeze-out mergers and those governing freeze-out
tender offers along two dimensions: through a more careful explica-
tion of what Solomon actually holds with respect to, first, the obligation
of a controlling shareholder in making a freeze-out tender offer and,
second, the obligation of target directors in responding to one. Pure
takes up the task along both fiduciary dimensions.
C. Convergence in the Standards Governing Freeze-out
Mergers and Freeze-out Tender Offers
After expressing skepticism as to the substantive justifications
for treating freeze-out tender offers and freeze-out mergers differ-
ently, Pure makes use of a small doctrinal sleight of hand to increase
and make explicit a controlling shareholder's obligations in structur-
ing a freeze-out tender offer.167  Even under the chancery court's
broad reading of Solomon, the Solomon "get out of jail free" card can
be used only if the tender offer is noncoercive . Pure imposes addi-
tional requirements on freeze-out tender offers by detailing and ex-
panding the conditions that must be met for an offer to be deemed
noncoercive.9 A freeze-out tender offer by a controlling shareholder
will be noncoercive, and therefore will satisfy the controlling share-
holder's fiduciary obligations under Solomon, only if (i) the offer is
subject to a nonwaivable majority of the minority tender condition,
(ii) the controlling shareholder commits to consummate a short-form
merger promptly after increasing its holdings above ninety percent,
(iii) the controlling shareholder "has made no retributive threats," 
1 7
much as a fleeting doubt of the fairness of the foreclosure or the $1.50 tender
offer" price is correct as a matter of law.
Id. (quoting Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at
*5 n.5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995)). Whatever else may be buried in this passage, the
court hardly holds that the legal standard governing the directors' obligation has been
watered down; only controlling shareholders have had their burdens reduced. This
reading is consistent with the cases cited by the Solomon court, id., which focus only on
the controlling shareholder's duties and predate the clarification of board duties in a
takeover scenario that began with Unocal, supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
167 See 808 A.2d at 445 ("The potential for coercion and unfairness posed by con-
trolling shareholders ... requires some equitable reinforcement .....
6 See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 (emphasizing that noncoercion is the
key to the escape from entire fairness review allowed in Solomon).
169 See 808 A.2d at 445 (noting that such conditions provide protections which
'minimize the distorting influence of the tendering process on voluntary choice").
170 1d. This condition reflects Pures interesting discussion of the differencebetween
structural coercion, that is, coercion resulting from the terms of the tender offer, id. at
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and (iv) the independent directors are given complete discretion and
sufficient time "to react to the tender offer, by (at the very least),,.171
hiring their own advisors, providing a recommendation to the
non-controlling shareholders, and disclosing adequate information to
allow the non-controlling shareholders an opportunity for informed
decision making.
72
438, and inherent coercion, the power of the controlling shareholder-"the 800-
pound gorilla," as the court terms it, id. at 436-to impose costs on non-controlling
shareholders through its operation of the company if the non-controlling shareholders
reject the freeze-out tender offer, id. Here, recognition of the extent to which Sinclair,
280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971), restricts a vengeful response to rejection would have
been helpful.
"' Pure, 808 A.2d at 445.
172 Id. To be explicit, we read this open-ended invitation to action as arising from
Pure's use of the parenthetical phrase "at the very least" to modify its list of what direc-
tors require the time and discretion to accomplish. Id.
The Pure court's insistence on detailed disclosure of the investment bank's valua-
tion workup is one of the genuine innovations in the decision because it corrects for a
lacuna in the federal disclosure pattern covering freeze-outs. Exchange Act Rule 13e-
3, which was promulgated in 1979 to address an earlier wave of going-private transac-
tions, excepted from its special disclosure requirements a transaction where the minor-
ity shareholders received parent stock (or any listed stock). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-
3 (g) (2) (iii) (2003) (exempting listed securities from disclosure). This limitation in
coverage to cash-out mergers was founded on the mistaken belief that recipients of
parent stock were not really frozen out since they "are on an equal footing and are
permitted to maintain an equivalent or enhanced equity interest." Going Private
Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release No.
16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,738 (Aug. 8, 1979) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). This
belief, of course, forgets that the exchange ratio in a controlling shareholder freeze-
out where equity is used as the consideration is just as crucial-and just as subject to
opportunism-as the amount of cash. The new wave of freeze-out tender offers has
mainly involved exchange offers that can avoid the detailed disclosure requirements of
the federal rule. Perhaps more crucially, exchange offers allow companies to avoid
specific disclosure as to whether the parent "reasonably believes that the Rule 13e-3
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders," 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014(a)
(2003), and to omit stating "in reasonable detail the material factors upon which
[that] belief... is based," § 229.1014(b). So, unless the state fiduciary law is appropri-
ately crafted, controlling shareholders will shift from mergers to exchange freeze-out
tender offers, and "fairness" will drop out of such transactions altogether.
There is a parallel disclosure inconsistency in the context of the friendly arm's-
length deal. In the case of a merger, disclosure under the federal securities laws must
be made of the target's investment banker workup. See Schedule 14A, Item 14, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2003), which references Form S-4, id. § 239.25, which in turn
references the disclosure required in Schedule 13E-3, Item 9, id. § 240.13e-100 (which
in turn references Item 1015 of Regulation M-A, id. § 229.1015). No comparable dis-
closure need be made in the case of a tender offer-compare Recommendation or So-
licitation by the Subject Company and Others, id. § 240.14d-9, and Schedule 14D-9, id.
§ 240.14d-101. This difference, which makes sense in a case of a hostile tender offer
(why disclose the target's possible reservation price?), is not appropriate where the
tender offer is part of a friendly transaction, for example, a tender offer followed by a
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For purposes of a freeze-out tender offer, then, Pure says that
robust engagement by a target board (i.e., a special committee) as a
bargaining agent for the minority shareholders is necessary to avoid
173
coercion 7. This goal requires both the controller's permission for
such activity and the target board's undertaking of it. In that sense,
Pure substantially modifies Siliconix and Aquila, which would permit
target board passivity. 74
Pure's broad interpretation of "coercion" is consistent with Dela-
ware jurisprudence in the hostile-bid area, where "substantive coer-
cion"-bid pressure that might induce target shareholders to mistak-
enly accept a low-ball offer-constitutes a "threat" that in turn justifies
a target board response much like "structural coercion"-bid pres-
sure that arises from a structure exploiting shareholder collective-
action problems. 75 In the freeze-out case, unless the target board is a
vigorous bargaining agent for the minority shareholders, the control-
ler's bid will be at the low end of the settlement range, a low-ball offer.
So it makes perfect sense in a freeze-out tender offer both to place
certain limits on the controller's behavior and to require the inde-
pendent directors to act as genuine bargaining agents, including
forming an opinion about the desirability of the controller's offer.
The measure of convergence, then, is how this standard for freeze-
out tender offers compares operationally to the entire fairness re-
view contemplated for freeze-out mergers under Kahn I and Kahn II.
Start with Kahn I. If the freeze-out merger satisfies the fair-dealing
freeze-out merger. Of course, a board informed by Pure might well decide to make
such disclosure as a matter of state law fiduciary duty.
Note also that the interaction of the target board's disclosure requirements under
Schedule 14D-9 and now under Pure in the case of a freeze-out tender offer could give
the special committee a certain negotiating leverage. Presumably the special commit-
tee will not disclose the investment banker information until the end of the negotiat-
ing process, and the bidder would be hard-pressed not to extend the offer to permit
the shareholder assimilation of the new disclosure, which will be filed as an amend-
ment to Schedule 14D-9.
173 808 A.2d at 445-47.
174 See supra text accompanying notes 137-60 for the Siliconix and Aquila discus-
sions. Pure's framework in this regard now seems established as the law of the Dela-
ware Chancery Court. See Next Level Communications, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No.
20144, 2003 WL 549083, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2003) ("[T]he court will apply the
framework of analysis... most recently discussed in the Pure Resources case."). As a
matter of practice, target boards are taking a more energetic role in freeze-out tender
offers. For one description of this phenomenon, see Robin Sidel, Takeover Targets Force
Up Offers in 'Minority Squeeze-Out'Deals, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2002, at C3.
05 808 A.2d at 438-40; see also supra note 170 (defining "structural coercion" and
contrasting the concept with "inherent coercion").
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component of Weinberger, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff
with respect to fair price."76 Most importantly, a fair reading of Kahn I
seems to require that a special committee be given some substantial
freedom to say "no" before the burden will shift.177 Under Pure, in
contrast, the court does not mention a right to say "no." Pure accepts
the fact that the controlling shareholder may go to the minority
178shareholders over the special committee's objection.
In assessing this difference, two points are important. First, we
need to be a little clearer about just what the right to say "no" under
Kahn I really means. In our view, this right amounts to the special
committee's prerogative to reject the merger if it believes that the
merger consideration is inadequate, meaning that the controlling
shareholder who nevertheless wants to proceed must make a tender
offer to the minority shareholders.17 9 On the other hand, nothing in
Kahn I suggests that the special committee rejecting the merger is ob-
ligated to try and block a subsequent tender offer.8 Thus, if we think
of the Kahn I right to say "no" as the equivalent of an Interco pill that
buys the board time but not ultimate veto power,"" Pure operates as
176 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).
We recognize that this summary is operational shorthand for the murky statements in
Kahn land Kahn I. See supra text accompanying notes 61-71 (detailing the unresolved
issues regarding the fairness standard left open by Kahn land Kahn 11).
77 638 A.2d at 1120-21. For an earlier discussion of Kahn l's requirements, see
supra notes 52-58, 61-65 and accompanying text.
,,8 See 808 A.2d at 437 (implying that the support of the special committee is not
required since "the tender offer takes place between the controlling shareholder and
the minority shareholders[, and] ... the short-form merger can be effected by the
controlling shareholder itself').
179 Conceivably, the controlling shareholder could use its power over the board to
discharge the special committee and proceed with the merger. Such action, however,
would appropriately trigger a high degree ofjudicial scrutiny and skepticism.
180 From our perspective, this limitation on the special committee's role is appro-
priate since it would be even harder to justify giving independent directors in a con-
trolled company the right to flatly 'just say no"-in effect a Unitrin poison pill-than it
would be to give independent directors such a right in the case of an uncontrolled
company. At least in an uncontrolled company, affected shareholders who want to ac-
cept a hostile bid despite the board's objection actually elect the directors and have
the power to replace them.
In City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc., the chancery court limited a target
board's defensive tactics to those necessary to evaluate the offer, communicate with
shareholders, and seek or devise an alternative. 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
When those tasks were completed, the shareholders were then free to accept or reject
the hostile offer. Id. at 798-800. By an Interco pill, we mean a poison pill that must be
redeemed when these tasks have been completed. See Gilson, A Short Reply, supra note
101, at 47 (defining an Interco pill as a poison pill that "allows management time to
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something of a functional alternative. In both cases the board can
thoroughly examine the bid, propose alternatives, and advise share-
holders, but ultimately the matter remains the shareholder's choice.
On this dimension, then, there is only a narrow gap between Kahn
I and Pure with respect to the consequence of a board's decision
to exercise this time-limited veto. In Pure, the controlling share-
holder's fiduciary test is whether it can demonstrate, through satisfac-
tion of the anticoercion litany, that the shareholders have not been
"coerced." 18 2  Kahn II achieves a similar result in the freeze-out
merger, at least as to the fair-dealing prong of the entire fairness
analysis. 183 Because the Kahn H controlling shareholder could demon-
strate that the minority shareholders were not, in fact, coerced, the fact
that the special committee was coerced (via the threat to make a tender
offer over their objections to the merger proposal) simply drops out
of the fair-dealing case.184
We are then left only with what is a procedural, but very impor-
tant, difference with respect to fair price in the two scenarios. We first
note that there should not be a substantive difference between Pure
and Kahn I and Kahn II with respect to fair price. Weinberger dictates
that an appraisal measure of value be used in an entire fairness pro-
ceeding, including the potential for the award of equitable relief if
appropriate. The measure of value would be essentially the same
under Pure because, if the anticoercion litany is satisfied, plaintiffs are
relegated to their appraisal remedy; if it is not, then the entire fairness
standard applies.
The procedural difference, however, is critical. As we have stressed,
an entire fairness proceeding under Weinberger, Kahn I, and Kahn I
provides the equivalent of a class appraisal proceeding without the
secure an alternative transaction and persuade shareholders that the bid price is too
low, but does not allow management ultimately to block the offer").
182 See 808 A.2d at 44546 (noting that compliance with the anticoercion litany sat-
isfies a board's fiduciary duty with respect to a tender offer). We believe it is a fair
reading of the opinion to think that the burden of proof rests with the defendants re-
garding the anticoercion litany. Moreover, the Pure litany seems a pretty good metric
for determining whether the shareholders are actually coerced.
183 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 85-86 (Del. 1995).
184 See id. at 86 (rejecting a finding of unfair dealing despite the controlling share-
holder's coercion of the special committee since there was no coercion of the minority
shareholders). Because the court fails to explain why it found that the shareholders
were not coerced, one has to take the Delaware Supreme Court's finding largely on
faith.
185 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
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need for shareholders actually to perfect their appraisal rights."'6 In
contrast, if the Pure anticoercion litany is met, shareholders must per-
fect their appraisal rights both informally, by not tendering their
shares in the tender offer, and formally, by meeting the statutory re-
quirements in connection with the mandated short-form merger.17
Thus, the treatment of freeze-out mergers and freeze-out tender
offers after Pure pretty much converge with the still substantial excep-
tion of the difference between a class and non-class procedure for
challenging value."8 At this point, Pure makes apparent its preference
for how to resolve the final discrepancy: "To the extent that my deci-
sion... causes some discordance between the treatment of similar
transactions to persist, that lack of harmony is better addressed in the
[Kahn] line, by affording greater liability-immunizing effect to protec-
tive devices such as majority of minority approval conditions and spe-
cial committee negotiation and approval.' 8 9 In particular, the opin
ion suggests business judgment protection when a transaction meets a
high process standard.' 9° Freeze-out mergers then would be treated
the same way as freeze-out tender offers after Pure; if anticoercion
standards were met, minority shareholders would be relegated to the
appraisal remedy for challenging value.'91
186 Supra text accompanying notes 42-46, 52-66.
187 808 A.2d at 446-47.
188 We agree with Vice Chancellor Strine's conclusion in In re Cysive, Inc. Sharehold-
ers Litigation, No. 20341, 2003 WL 21961453, at *15-16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2003), that
any potential difference on the burden-shifting question, particularly on "fair value," is
not generally material either at the pleading stage or at trial.
189 808 A.2d at 444.
Id. at 446. That result is roughly consistent with the approach recommended
by the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance, which makes appraisal the exclusive rem-
edy in a freeze-out merger when the directors who approve the transaction for the con-
trolled corporation "have an adequate basis, grounded on substantial objective evi-
dence, for believing that the consideration offered to the minority shareholders in the
transaction constitutes fair value for their shares." PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.25(a) (1) (1994).
191 It is possible that the fallout from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.S., 15 U.S.C.S., 18
U.S.C.S., 28 U.S.C.S., 29 U.S.C.S.), may impose a harmonization of Pure and Kahn 1, at
least with respect to NASDAQ-listed companies. Under the proposed amendments to
the NASDAQ rules following Sarbanes-Oxley, all companies are required to have a ma-
jority of independent directors and compensation, nomination, and audit committees
made up only of independent directors. Rule Change and Amendments to NASD
Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding Board Independence and Independent Committees,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,516, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,452-53 (proposed Mar. 17, 2003).
In the case of a controlled corporation, the requirements for a majority of independ-
ent directors and independent-only compensation and nominating committees do
not apply. Id. As the description of the proposed rules makes clear, however, the
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We think it is important that the Delaware Supreme Court resolve
the difference between the availability of a class appraisal remedy in
freeze-out mergers and freeze-out tender offers,1 9 2 but there is an al-
ternative to reconsidering Kahn I. The court could instead harmonize
the treatment of the two transaction forms by reconsidering Solomon,
or at least the chancery court's extension of Solomon to freeze-outs
(a result, we have noted, which the Delaware Supreme Court has
"controlled company exception does not extend to the audit committee requirements
[only independent directors] under Rule 4350." Id. at 14,454 (emphasis omitted).
Proposed Rule 4350(h), dealing with conflicts of interest, then requires that all related-
party transactions "be approved by the company's audit committee or another [com-
parable] independent body of the board of directors." Rule Change and Amendment
to Require an Issuer's Audit Committee or Another Independent Body of the Board of
Directors to Approve Related Party Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 48,137, 68
Fed. Reg. 42,152, 42,152 (proposed July 8, 2003) (alteration in original) (emphasis
omitted). If a freeze-out merger is a related-party transaction, then the audit commit-
tee of a company listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD)
has the absolute right to block a freeze-out transaction. In other words, Kahn II's
assessment of the entire fairness of a freeze-out merger without the approval of a
committee with blocking power will not be available. If this is correct, then pressure
on the Delaware Chancery Court's handling of freeze-out tender offers will increase,
and a reassessment of Solomon seems only more compelling.
192 We do not make this suggestion simply for reasons of doctrinal coherence-
Delaware has survived the functional inconsistencies arising from the equal dignity ac-
corded to different statutory treatment of equivalent transactional techniques. See, e.g.,
Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963) (noting that the Delaware
"sale-of-assets statute and the merger statute are independent of each other [and] ...
of equal dignity, and the framers of a reorganization plan may resort to either type of
corporate mechanics to achieve the desired end"). Rather, the inconsistency between
Pure and Kahn may leave a special committee on uncomfortable terrain, pressed to
approve a merger it objects to because such a merger leaves shareholders in a better
litigation position ex post. In Kahn redux, for example, the special committee would
know that capitulation to the merger terms offers two advantages to the minority.
First, the merger would preserve a class appraisal remedy, whereas the transactional
alternative in which the special committee refuses the merger and the controlling
shareholder proceeds by tender offer could leave only statutory appraisal. Second,
shareholders are entirely free to express their preferences in a merger vote; the ten-
dering decision may be influenced by calculations regarding the offer's probability of
success and the time-value-of-money costs of waiting for the second step. Yet approval
of the merger to better protect minority rights could require insincerity and mislead-
ing disclosure that could distort the shareholder merger vote. And applicable fiduci-
ary law requires the board to withhold approval from a merger that it does not regard
as "fair." See Kahn v. Lynch Communications Sys., Inc., No. 8748, 1993 WL 290193, at
*4 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (criticizing
one of the independent directors for voting in favor of the merger even though he did
not believe that the price was fair by stating, "The fact that the alternatives to Alcatel's
overture were limited does not mean that the Independent Committee should have
agreed to a price that was unfair"). In other words, it is not simply that the Kahn/Pure
inconsistency is unaesthetic, but also that it will whipsaw the target board and poten-
tially deprive shareholders of relevant information.
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not yet endorsed) . Harmonization would follow either from the
elimination of the class appraisal remedy, where the controlling
shareholder has demonstrated Pure-like process in a freeze-out
merger, or from a declaration that the fair-price prong of the entire
fairness standard applies in a freeze-out tender offer.
The arguments in favor of revisiting Kahn I are substantial. We
are sympathetic to the Pure court's preference for a resolution to the
treatment of freeze-outs that focuses on the court's assessing process,
rather than determining value. 194 An appraisal proceeding puts the
court in a quite difficult position. Weinberger instructed the chancery
court to apply modem financial techniques in establishing the value
of the controlled corporation's stock in a freeze-out to the end of
eliminating the arbitrariness of the old Delaware block method.1 95 As
a practical matter, however, the result is likely to be one of dueling
experts, each applying the tools of modern finance to end up at vastly
different valuations. This situation, in turn, leaves the court to assess
the validity of the experts' differing assumptions about risk measures,
interest rates, and the myriad of other factors that drive the ultimate
valuation-an assessment with which ajudge should appropriately feel
quite uncomfortable.' 96 It is hardly surprising, then, that the Pure
court favors giving the parties and the court a process-based alterna-
tive.
197
193 See supra note 122 (pointing out the Delaware Supreme Court's emphasis on
the fact that the Solomon transaction was not a freeze-out).
194 808 A.2d at 434.
195 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983) ("[T]he stan-
dard 'Delaware block' or weighted average method of valuation ... shall no longer ex-
clusively control such proceedings.").
196 In the market for firms, or large blocks of stock, "fair value" emerges as the
endpoint of a bargaining process that may use various financial and non-financial met-
tics. The effort to reproduce this result in a judicial proceeding will necessarily pro-
duce diverse and contestable valuation methods that may leave the chancellor feeling
like ajudge in divorce court. See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell,Jr., The Impact of Modern
Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 18-37 tbls.1-18 (2003) (offer-
ing empirical evidence on diverse valuation methodologies).
197 Former Chancellor, now Professor, William T. Allen made this point persua-
sively in a discussion during the Penn Symposium at which an earlier draft of this Arti-
cle was presented. Since Professor Allen presided over the valuation process in Cin-
erama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), he plainly speaks from
experience. Nonetheless, we wonder whether there are not techniques that might
mitigate some of the problems associated with dueling valuation experts. For example,
more frequent use might be made of a court-appointed expert. See In re Appraisal of
Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1223 n.3 (Del. 1992) (inviting the chancery court to ap-
point a neutral expert witness in "the hope that the use of such an expert will bring
greater reason and clarity to the appraisal process"). We expect that the participation
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The attraction of a process-based harmonization is buttressed by
recent corporate governance developments that are likely to enhance
the independence of the special committee. Section 301 of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act requires every listed company to establish an audit
committee and requires that the committee be comprised solely of
"independent" directors.' 98 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
corporate governance proposal elaborates and strengthens this stan-
dard.' 99 Although the proposed rule exempts controlled companies
of such an expert would serve to reduce the distance between the experts' valuations
much like "baseball," or "final offer," techniques do in arbitration. These techniques
contemplate that the arbitrator has to select without adjustment whichever of the two
parties' valuations is most reasonable in the arbitrator's judgment. See Mediators, Inc.
v. Manney, 296 B.R. 89, 92-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering the parties' positions
on issues such as confession of judgment, accrual of interest, and quarterly payments
before choosing one side's proposal); CPR INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 1 CPR
MODEL ADR PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES SERIES: ADR GLOSSARY (1998) (defining
private alternative dispute resolution processes such as "baseball," or "final offer,"
arbitration), available at www.cpradr.org/adrprivate.htm. A more extreme variation
called "night baseball" simply requires the arbitrator to accept whichever of the
parties' valuations is closest to that of the arbitrator. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Business
Dispute Resolution-ADR and Beyond: An Opening Statement, 59 ALB. L. REV. 835, 840
n.14 (1996) (explaining the different variations of arbitration including "night base-
ball"). The point of the procedure is to eliminate the incentive for extreme valuations.
While in the judicial context the judge must make her own determination, the parties
may logically assume that the court-appointed expert is unlikely to credit extreme
valuations and that the court will likely give more credence to the neutral expert.
Thus, there will be substantial incentive to offer a valuation that the court-appointed
expert will view as reasonable.
Moreover, a valuation procedure that comes after a special committee process is
likely to be much more manageable than otherwise. The plaintiff class's expert will be
constrained by the special committee's settlement range and by the substantial evi-
dence on valuation that will already have been developed.
198 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78j-1 (m) (3) (B) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 2003):
In order to be considered to be independent for purposes of this paragraph, a
member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her
capacity* as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any
other board committee-
(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the is-
suer; or
(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
1 Rule Change and Amendment No. I Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange,
Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,051 (proposed Apr. 11, 2003)
[hereinafter Rule Change and Amendment No. 1]. The NYSE proposal and the com-
parable NASD proposal have been approved, with minor subsequent amendment, by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Order Approving Proposed Rule
Changes and Amendments No. I Thereto and Notice of Filing and Order Granting
Accelerated Approval of Amendments Relating to Corporate Golernance, Exchange
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from the general listing requirement of a majority of independent di-
rectors, controlled companies must nevertheless establish an audit
committee that consists of at least three independent directors .2 ° The
NYSE's "independence" standard would require a board determina-
tion that the director in question had "no material relationship" with
the listed company and includes a three-year cooling-off period for
many of the most common kinds of prior connections that might• 201
undermine independence. The NYSE would also add special inde-
pendence requirements for audit committee members that exclude
any compensation for consulting, financial, or legal services; that re-
quire all audit committee members to be "financially literate"; and
that require at least one member to "have accounting or related
,202
financial management expertise. Thus, in most future parent-
subsidiary, freeze-out situations, the special committee will almost cer-
tainly consist of directors with much greater independence and per-
haps more financial sophistication than has been commonly the case
in the past.20
s
Moreover, in light of the extensive experience with special com-
mittees in many contexts-including management buyouts, derivative
litigation, as well as going-private transactions-we have a much better
developed sense of the institutional structure that can make such com-
204mittees more effective. Hiring independent financial and legal advi-
sors seems particularly important (and seems to be part of the Pure
Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003) [hereinafter SEC NYSE Or-
der].
200 Rule Change and Amendment No. 1, supra note 199, at 19,052.
201 SEC NYSE Order, supra note 199, at 64,157 (reiterating the "independence"
standard and explaining that NYSE modified its original proposal to shorten the cool-
ing-off period from five to three years).
202 Rule Change and Amendment No. 1, supra note 199, at 19,055 (emphasis omit-
ted).
203 Similar standards have been proposed by the NASD for NASDAQ-listed compa-
nies. See supra note 191 (discussing proposed amendments following Sarbanes-Oxley).
The potential impact of these new governance standards is apparent even in the small
sample of freeze-out cases we discuss. None of the special committee members in Sili-
conix would have been "independent" under either the NYSE standards for the general
board or audit committees or the Sarbanes-Oxley standard for audit committees. Simi-
larly, the target board in Aquila had no independent members.
204 See, e.g., Gregory V. Varallo, William M. McErlean & Russell C. Silberglied, From
Kahn to Carlton: Recent Developments in Special Committee Practice, 53 Bus. LAW. 397,
400 (1998) (arguing that rules are now reasonably well-developed). On the mixed
early history of director independence in a prior cycle of going-private transactions,
see William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?,
45 Bus. LAW. 2055, 2056 (1990).
[Vol. 152: 785
2003] CONTROLLING CONtROLLING SHAREHOLDERS 837
anticoercion litany) not only because the specially retained advisors
will have reputational capital at stake, but also because of the competi-
tive dynamics between the special committee "team" and the man-
agement team.
At the same time, however, there is a powerful argument in favor
of harmonizing the treatment of freeze-out mergers and freeze-out
tender offers by reconsidering the extension of Solomon to freeze-outs.
The logic of this approach is faithful adherence to the symmetry
of rules that control controlling shareholders' extraction of private
benefits. In a freeze-out, controlling shareholders can be expected to
retain the prior level of private benefits (as already impounded in the
pre-freeze-out price of minority shares);20' the concern is to ensure
that the minority receives a premium that reflects a fair share of the
synergy gains. The gains that result from freezing out minority share-
holders require the contribution of both the controlling and non-
controlling shareholders; the gains must then be fairly divided be-
tween them. Where a gain is created by the sale of control, pro rata
sharing results automatically,2°6 but in a freeze-out, the division of that
gain parallels a self-dealing transaction covered by the Sinclair stan-
dard. Thus, a class-based appraisal remedy-the equivalent of a Sin-
clair remedy-is called for regardless of the transaction form, and the
holding that the Delaware Supreme Court should reconsider is the
chancery court's application of Solomon to freeze-out tender offers,
207rather than Kahn I's provision of class-based appraisal.
Moreover, this approach avoids what would be a troubling incon-
sistency in Delaware law: minority shareholders of a controlled com-
pany receiving less protection when faced with a hostile "internal"
tender offer than when faced with a hostile "external" tender offer. In
the "external" case, the board is fully empowered to resist the offer,
with a Unitrin pill, to the point where even maximally sophisticated
205 See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of the
standards that limit the extraction of private benefits.
206 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (describing the results from a sale
of control).
207 It may also seem an odd time for the Delaware Supreme Court to make a move
that, by reconsidering Kahn I, reduces the protection of public minority shareholders.
The court's recent stress on minority protection in cases like McMullin and Omnicare
certainly bespeaks increased concern for the interests of minority shareholders. A
court that has historically shown sensitivity to general trends in political economy may
be reluctant to embrace reduced shareholder protection in response to what looks
like an end run around previously established fiduciary standards. See supra note 31
(discussing Delaware's sensitivity to federal competition in the establishing of fiduciary
rules).
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institutional investors cannot accept a bid in the face of the board's
contraryjudgment. The board's arm's-length bargaining power and a
competitive takeover market protect the shareholders from a low-ball
offer. By contrast, since an "internal" tender offer faces no competi-
tive threat from a bust-up bidder, the controlling shareholder might
exploit inside information and timing advantages that would be non-
policeable; at best, the target board can use an Interco pill to protect
itself. The harmonization choice-whether to relax judicial treatment
of freeze-out mergers or to tighten the treatment of freeze-out tender
offers-depends on an assessment of the controlling shareholder's
incentives to make a low-ball offer in each scenario in light of the pro-
cedural burdens of statutory appraisal. From this perspective, leaving
controlling shareholders more discretion with a freeze-out tender of-
fer undermines the barriers to low-ball freeze-outs.
We find the choice between a reconsideration of Kahn I and a re-
consideration of the extension of Solomon to freeze-outs a close ques-
tion. In the end, the weight of the considerations on both sides leads
us to prefer a hybrid approach that involves reconsideration of both
Kahn I and Solomon. We share the Pure court's conclusion that a fully
empowered special committee, including the Pure anticoercion litany
and the right to say "no," affords sufficient process so that entire fair-
208ness review in a freeze-out merger can be eliminated. Where inde-
pendent directors have the power to block a freeze-out merger, but
208 We offer a friendly amendment to the Pure anticoercion litany to further ad-
vance a tender offer structure that would avoid certain elements of distorted share-
holder choice. Pure requires the controller to make a tender offer with a mandatory
majority-of-minority condition and the promise to consummate a short-form merger if
the ninety percent threshold is achieved, but it does not require a ninety percent
achievement condition. Supra text accompanying notes 170-72. Such an offer could
force a tender decision from a shareholder otherwise opposed to the offer but also
worried about the decreased liquidity and other disadvantages of being a minority
shareholder in a company where, say, eighty-five percent of the stock is privately held.
(Assume, for example, an offer made by a fifty-five percent shareholder that obtains
another thirty percent of the company's stock, easily satisfying the majority-of-minority
condition.) In other words, the ninety percent threshold for consummating a short-
form merger is not the threshold of concern about being frozen in as a minority
shareholder in a thinly traded stock. So the Pure anticoercion litany should be amended
to require that, for an offer without a ninety percent achievement condition, where the
majority-of-minority condition has been satisfied, the offer must be extended for a rea-
sonable period to give shareholders who initially failed to tender a renewed opportu-
nity to do so. In effect, for this special group of tender offers, this addition would, as a
matter of state law, require bidders to offer a subsequent offering period under Rule
14d-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-11 (2003). See Grand Metro. P.L.C. v. The Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1060 (Del. Ch. 1988) (imposing a comparable requirement in the bid-
der's offer as a condition for a grant of equitable relief).
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do not, it is fair to assume that the process sufficiently tracks an arm's-
length negotiation which fairly relegates shareholders to their appraisal
remedy. To this extent, we favor revisiting Kahn I.
But what if the special committee rejects the proposed freeze-out
merger and the controlling shareholder goes over the committee's
head as in Siliconix? Here, the chancery court's extension of Solomon
to freeze-out tender offers also should be reconsidered. If the con-
trolling shareholder seeks to override the special committee's veto,
the process no longer matches an arm's-length transaction-the mi-
nority shareholders lose the protection of their bargaining agent, and
unlike in a hostile tender offer, the protection of the market for cor-
porate control is not available. Under these circumstances, the trans-
action remains a Sinclair-like interested transaction, and entire fair-
ness protection (here meaning "fair price") is appropriate-an out-
come consistent with the symmetric controls governing the extraction
of private benefits by controlling shareholders. One particular advan-
tage of this hybrid approach is that it strengthens the bargaining posi-
tion of the special committee by giving its "say 'no"' power more bite.
As the special committee's "threat point"209 shifts from statutory ap-
praisal to class-based appraisal, the conditions of arm's-length bargain-
ing are more nearly replicated. This outcome should appeal to the
concerns that animate both the Kahn I and Pure courts.
In summary, in harmonizing the Kahn and Solomon lines of cases
to achieve convergence in the legal rules governing freeze-out merg-
ers and tender offers, we think there are two critical factors: first,
whether the special committee had the power to say "no," at least to
the extent of an Interco pill, and the offer was otherwise noncoercive
(i.e, whether the Pure anticoercion litany was complied with) and, sec-
ond, whether the offer was in fact approved by the special committee.
If both of these conditions are satisfied, then the business judgment
rule should apply to the freeze-out transaction, whether merger or
209 The "threat" being the consequence to the controller of the special commit-
tee's non-agreement.
210 We think the Delaware Supreme Court could also take account of develop-
ments since Kahn I that may additionally mitigate some concerns about the control-
ler's "inherent coercion" of the minority, including the development of institutional
practices and corporate governance rules that buttress the special committee's inde-
pendence in fact. See, e.g., supra notes 198-203 (offering examples of recent corporate
governance rules articulated by Congress and the NYSE). This resolution also has the
benefit of effectively eliminating the often confusing process of non-bifurcated review
that melds fair dealing and fair price in a way which diverts attention away from the
economic judgments to be made.
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tender offer, and the minority shareholders should be limited to statu-
tory appraisal. The minority shareholders have received the benefits
of a virtual arm's-length bargaining process over division of the gains
associated with the freeze-out and have accepted a noncoercive offer.
On the other hand, if the special committee does not approve the
proposal but the controlling shareholder proceeds anyway, then the
transaction should be subject to entire fairness review and minority
shareholders should have a class-based appraisal remedy. This implies
that, for a case like Siliconix, the special committee's rejection of the
offer would leave the controlling shareholder with the burden of
demonstrating that its tender offer to the public shareholders satisfies
entire fairness review, per Kahn II. The further implication is that the
terms of a freeze-out merger that result from an appropriate commit-
tee process and an uncoerced shareholder vote should be reviewed on
a business judgment standard, not entire fairness. 1'
211 If the Pure anticoercion litany is not complied with, entire fairness review is, of
course, appropriate. We think that controlling shareholders will have ample incentives
to facilitate an active special committee process even in cases where the committee
contemplates that non-agreement is likely and that a tender offer directly to the share-
holders will be necessary. The special committee process is likely to set a valuation that
would narrow the range a court might find in a subsequent entire fairness proceeding.
The plaintiff class's expert would be limited by what the special committee was pre-
pared to settle for in hard bargaining, and a lot of evidence would be generated on the
valuation questions from a good faith bargaining effort. Without a special committee
process, the expert would not be so constrained, and the controller would face greater
risk of a high judgment. In any event we are puzzled by the suggestion in Krasner v.
Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 286-88 (Del. 2003), that an otherwise appropriate special com-
mittee process might be undercut by the fact that ultimately the entire board votes on
the merger proposal that the special committee has negotiated.
We note that other commentators favor extending entire fairness protection to
freeze-out tender offers while not necessarily adopting our hybrid approach. See, e.g.,
Kimble Charles Cannon, Augmenting the Duties of Directors to Protect Minority Shareholders
in the Context of Going-Private Transactions: The Case for Obligating Directors to Express a
Valuation Opinion in Unilateral Tender Offers After Siliconix, Aquila and Pure Resources,
2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191, 240-52 (proposing several non-hybrid ways to protect
minority shareholders faced with controlling-party tender offers, including changes in
Delaware Code); Brian M. Resnick, Note, Recent Delaware Decisions May Prove to be "En-
tirely Unfair" to Minority Shareholders in Parent Merger with Partially Owned Subsidiary, 2003
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 253, 282 (recommending that Siliconix be overturned or that the
Delaware Supreme Court "impose a procedural fiduciary obligation on the board ...
of the subsidiary to negotiate with the parent as zealously as it would with a third-party
bidder").
Experienced Delaware practitioner Frank Balotti and his coauthors agree with our
general concerns, but would instead revisit Glassman to require a limited hearing
on fair-price issues or a legislative revision of the appraisal statute to make the extra
amount determined in an appraisal proceeding following a short-form merger pay-
able to all shareholders in a freeze-out transaction. Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin
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D. Convergence in the Standards Governing Target Board Duties
in Responding to a Freeze-out Tender Offer
and a Hostile Tender Offer
Harmonizing the different standards that govern the controlling
shareholder's obligation in freeze-out mergers and freeze-out tender
offers still leaves a discrepancy between the standards governing the
target board's duties in responding to a freeze-out tender offer, which
Siliconix and Aquila implicitly eliminate, and the target board's duty to
respond to a hostile tender offer, which the Delaware Supreme Court
has taken quite seriously. The issue was posed starkly in Pure by the
plaintiffs' claim (supported by the special committee's aborted effort
to block the offer) that the target board should have adopted a poison
• 1212
pill.21
While it is hard not to share the Pure court's impatience with the
claim that the board only has an obligation to stand up for sharehold-
ers when it is in management's interest to do so,1 we also share the
court's conclusion that there should be no blanket "duty on the part
of the independent directors to seek blocking power"2 14 through the
right to adopt a pill. The explanation derives from the inherent ten-
sion between the board's role in protecting the shareholders and the
shareholder's role in making the ultimate decision whether to accept
or reject the tender offer.
In a 'just say no" regime in which target directors-even after they
have investigated, negotiated, communicated, and explored alterna-
tives-have the right to prevent the shareholders from accepting a
hostile tender offer by declining to redeem a pill, there is no coherent
case for not demanding that target directors who confront a freeze-
out tender offer have the same power at their disposal. As we have
Balotti & Timo Rehbock, Delaware's Going-Private Dilemma: Fostering Protections for Minor-
ity Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix and Unocal Exploration, 58 Bus. LAw. 519, 548-
58 (2003). The legislative proposal, in particular, has much to recommend it since it
would provide a class-based appraisal remedy, but it may also inject the court into
valuation disputes that could be better resolved by bargaining through the special
committee process which we have outlined. For a contrary view that defends the pres-
ent arrangements, see Jon E. Abramczyk et al., Going-Private "Dilemma"?-Not in Dela-
ware, 58 Bus. LAW. 1351 (2003).
212 Supra note 162 and accompanying text.
213 The court referred to "the rough fairness of the goose and gander rule." In re
Pure Resources, Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 446 (Del. Ch. 2002).
Id. The court also held that, "[w]hen a controlling stockholder makes a tender
offer that is not coercive in the sense I have articulated.... there is no duty on [that
controlling shareholder's] part to permit the target board to block the bid through use
of the pill." Id.
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suggested, target shareholders need the protection even more in a
freeze-out tender offer because the market for corporate control is
not available to protect them. Alternatively, observance of the Pure
anticoercion litany-after which target directors, having acted dili-
gently on behalf of the shareholders step back and let the sharehold-
ers decide whether to accept a hostile tender offer-is a fair proxy for
the Interco pill that a shareholder choice regime would dictate. This
correspondence is especially tight if, as we propose for the freeze-out
tender offer, the process is coupled with entire fairness review of price
when the controlling shareholder goes over the head of an independ-
ent committee.
In the end, Pure stops short of complete convergence of the doc-
trine governing target board responses to hostile and freeze-out ten-
der offers, openly expressing its preference for a shareholder choice
regime in connection with freeze-out tender offers, rather than
achieving complete convergence by requiring "the use of a device that
our statutory law only obliquely sanctions and that in other contexts is
subject to misuse, especially when used to block a high value bid that
is not structurally coercive. 2 1' Indeed, the Pure court makes a not-so-
veiled threat to achieve convergence by moving in the other direction:
"If our law trusts stockholders to protect themselves in the case of a
controlling stockholder tender offer that has the characteristics I have
described, this will obviously be remembered by advocates in cases in-
volving defenses against similarly noncoercive third-party tender of-
fers.' '216 Our hybrid harmonization, involving reconsideration of both
Kahn I and Solomon, results in the equivalent of an Interco regime for
freeze-outs consistent with the regime the Pure court properly and
candidly favors.
From our perspective, then, Pure does an admirable, if not yet
complete, job of restoring symmetry to the doctrinal constraints on
controlling shareholder extraction of private benefits by reestablish-
ing a rough convergence of the standards governing judicial review of
the fairness of freeze-out mergers and freeze-out tender offers within
the parameters imposed by prior case law. The broad reading of
Solomon offered by Siliconix and Aquila threatened to upset the bal-
ance among different techniques for extracting private benefits of
control by relaxing the restrictions on freeze-outs. Pure moves things
in the right direction and correctly invites the Delaware Supreme
215 Id.
216 Id. at 446 n.50.
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Court to finish the task of convergence. In our view, accomplishing
that task requires reconsidering both Kahn I and Solomon with the de-
sirable result of restoring symmetry to the law that controls control-
ling shareholders.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have argued that Delaware doctrine restricts the
extent to which controlling shareholders can extract private benefits
of control to a level at which it is plausible that the benefits to minor-
ity shareholders from reduction in managerial agency costs as a result
of concentrated monitoring by a controlling shareholder exceed the
costs of the controlling shareholders' private benefits of control. This
result is accomplished by the mix of rules governing self-dealing
transactions between the controlling shareholder and the controlled
corporation, the sale of control, and the freeze-out of non-controlling
shareholders. We then considered recent developments in the rules
governing sales of control and freeze-outs, arguing that Digex threat-
ened to tighten inappropriately the permissive rules governing sale of
control and that Siliconix and Aquila, before the useful correction by
Pure, threatened to loosen inappropriately the restrictive rules govern-
ing freeze-outs.
In the end, some may disagree with our evaluation of the appro-
priate levels of restriction governing different techniques for extract-
ing private benefits of control. The terms of this debate, however, will
be much more sharply focused if we have at least persuaded our read-
ers that the rules governing the three methods of extraction should be
evaluated simultaneously.
* * * * * *
